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ABSTRACT
The energy cost of asymmetric cryptography, a vital component of modern se-
cure communications, inhibits its wide spread adoption within the ultra-low energy
regimes such as Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs), Wireless Sensor Networks
(WSNs), and Radio Frequency Identification tags (RFIDs). In literature, a plethora
of hardware and software acceleration techniques exists for improving the perfor-
mance of asymmetric cryptography. However, very little attention has been focused
on the energy efficiency. Therefore, in this dissertation, I explore the design space
thoroughly, evaluating proposed hardware acceleration techniques in terms of energy
cost and showing how effective they are at reducing the energy per cryptographic op-
eration. To do so, I estimate the energy consumption for six different hardware/soft-
ware configurations across five levels of security, including both GF (p) and GF (2m)
computation. First, we design and evaluate an efficient baseline architecture for pure
software-based cryptography, which is centered around a pipelined RISC processor
with 256KB of program ROM and 16KB of RAM. Then, we augment our processor
design with simple, yet beneficial instruction set extensions for GF (p) computation
and evaluate the improvement in terms of energy per cryptographic operation com-
pared to the baseline microarchitecture. While examining the energy breakdown of
the system, it became clear that fetching instructions from program memory was
contributing significantly to the overall energy consumption. Thus, we implement a
parameterizable instruction cache and simulate various configurations. We determine
that for our working set, the energy-optimal instruction cache is 4KB, providing a
25% energy improvement over the baseline architecture for a 192-bit key-size. Next,
we introduce a reconfigurable GF (p) accelerator to our microarchitecture and mea-
ii
sure the energy per operation against the baseline and the ISA extensions. For ISA
extensions, we show between 1.32 and 1.45 factor improvement in energy efficiency
over baseline, while for full acceleration we demonstrate a 5.17 to 6.34 factor improve-
ment. Continuing towards greater efficiency, we investigate the energy efficiency of
different arithmetic by first adding GF (2m) instruction set extensions to our proces-
sor architecture and comparing them to their GF (p) counterpart. Finally, we design
a non-configurable 163-bit GF (2m) accelerator and perform some initial energy es-
timates, comparing them with our prior work. In the end, we discuss our ongoing
research and make suggestions for future work. The work presented here, along with
proposed future work, will aid in bringing asymmetric cryptography within reach of
ultra-low energy devices.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Since the advent of the microprocessor in the early 1970s, the number of com-
ponents that fit on a single Integrated Circuit (IC) has continued to climb. This
increase has primarily been due to advances in IC fabrication techniques, leading to
trends in device scaling first described by Gordon Moore in 1964 [1]. “Moore’s Law,”
the name given to the rapid growth in integrated circuit density, has given rise to
the System on a Chip (SoC), which has allowed miniature computer systems to be
embedded in everything from microwaves to the human body.
As SoCs become more ubiquitous, the desire to communicate with them escalates.
For example, many programmable thermostats now have built-in wireless capabili-
ties. Moreover, these devices are being trusted to communicate increasingly sensitive
data, while concerns for privacy grow stronger. Therefore, embedded devices need to
be equipped with algorithms such as asymmetric cryptography in order to securely
communicate.
1.1 Asymmetric Cryptography
Asymmetric cryptography, also known as public key cryptography, has become
an essential component in modern, secure communications. Unlike its symmetric
counterpart, asymmetric cryptography requires separate keys for encryption and de-
cryption, allowing it to solve a host of security challenges not possible with symmetric
cryptography alone. Uses for asymmetric cryptography range from session key es-
tablishment for secure communications to digital signatures for message authenticity
and non-repudiation. While symmetric cryptography is based on data shifts and
permutations, asymmetric cryptography is built upon a foundation of mathemati-
cally hard problems. As a result, the computational requirements for asymmetric
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cryptography are far greater than that of symmetric cryptography [2].
Employing asymmetric cryptography on ultra-low energy devices, such as Im-
plantable Medical Devices (IMDs) [3, 4], Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) [5], and
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags [6, 7], can be especially challenging. In
this class of applications, the energy cost of each operation is paramount to the
device’s utility. For example, in a typical IMD, each extra Joule expended in com-
putation reduces the life of the device, and each surgical replacement of the device
endangers the life of the patient. Security in this application is of critical importance;
unauthorized access to an implanted cardiac defibrillator’s programming interface
poses an unambiguous threat to the patent’s health and privacy.
Despite the obvious need for security in this domain, relatively few designs have
incorporated encryption; among these, most employ symmetric (shared-key) encryp-
tion techniques [3]. More secure schemes for communication exist that involve asym-
metric cryptography. However, the high computational cost of asymmetric cryptog-
raphy has put these schemes out of reach for ultra-low energy applications. In the
WSN domain, Wander et al. found that even weak asymmetric cryptography (160-
bit ECC, equivalent to 1024-bit RSA) consumes approximately 72% of the energy
allotted for communication handshaking. Moreover, they assume that only 5% to
10% of a WSN’s energy budget is available for handshakes [8]. Pabbuleti et al. show
that asymmetric cryptography reduces the energy cost of transmitting the signature
compared to hash-based authentication protocols; however, the energy cost of com-
putation rapidly exceeds the cost of signature transmission when considering 128-bit
security levels [9]. For RFID tags, it is difficult to quantify the energy budget for
encryption; however, because most tags are passive energy harvesters, the budget is
significantly less than that of a WSN node.
To alleviate this computational burden, special purpose hardware can be designed
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into an embedded system to accelerate portions of the cryptographic algorithms.
Hardware designed to perform specific computations will typically do so more effi-
ciently compared to hardware designed for general purpose computation. For the end
user, hardware acceleration yields an overall design that is not only more responsive
but is also much more energy efficient. Whereas past work has extensively evalu-
ated the performance gains associated with hardware acceleration, this work focuses
primarily on the energy benefit. In other words, this work attempts to comprehen-
sively quantify energy improvements available through the hardware acceleration of
asymmetric cryptography.
In the ultra-low energy domain, a spectrum of hardware/software acceleration
techniques exists, in which an increase in hardware acceleration will lower recon-
figurability in exchange for energy efficiency. Figure 1.1 depicts this trade-off with
compiled software executing on a power-conscious processor on one side and a fully
dedicated cryptographic processor on the other. The more interesting research lies
in the middle, where some degree of reconfigurability is maintained while the energy
consumed per operation is much less than that of a pure software implementation.
This area is precisely the portion of the spectrum our work attempts to capture.
Understanding the energy design space specific to asymmetric cryptography is
important in order to ensure the correct trade-offs are made prior to device fab-
rication. For example, a lack of reconfigurability could render the device obsolete
sooner, as security requirements change, while too little hardware acceleration could
render the device inoperable under assumed energy budgets. Furthermore, too much
hardware acceleration could unnecessarily increase the cost of design validation and
device fabrication. Thus, we compare different points on the spectrum and let the
system designer choose which level of acceleration is appropriate.
3
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Figure 1.1: The hardware acceleration trade-off.
1.2 Thesis Statement
In this dissertation, I provide a thorough evaluation of the design space of energy-
efficient asymmetric cryptography. In doing so, I describe the steps taken to design
and accurately model our embedded system, which includes the development of an
embedded processor with application specific extensions as well as two custom arith-
metic accelerators. This dissertation showcases the energy efficiency of our custom
arithmetic logic, making a strong argument for hardware acceleration of asymmetric
cryptography.
1.3 Contributions
For comparison, we start by evaluating a baseline architecture in terms of energy
cost per signature and verification operation, as defined by the Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) [10, 11]. Our baseline represents the left-most side of
Figure 1.1 and consists of a low-power RISC processor without an instruction cache
and a minimal memory layout, typical of an embedded microcontroller. Moving to
the right within Figure 1.1, we add simple yet effective instruction set extensions
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to our baseline architecture and evaluate the improvement in terms of energy cost
per operation. Next, we evaluate our system with a reconfigurable, microcoded
accelerator that we designed for prime finite-field arithmetic. As a comparison, we
evaluate the energy benefit of a non-configurable, accelerator that we designed for
binary finite-field arithmetic. Although the non-configurable aspect implies that the
level of security is fixed after device fabrication, this configuration yields the highest
degree of energy efficiency. Finally, we include an instruction cache in our design and
measure the energy improvement that it provides for the ISA extended architectures.
The contributions of this work are summarized as follows:
• Detailed power, energy and performance analysis of ultra-low energy asymmet-
ric cryptography for several different hardware/software configurations within
the same technology node, using the same experimental techniques
• Design space exploration across a range of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
key-sizes that includes up to 521-bit prime and 571-bit binary, providing insight
into current and future secure data exchange for embedded systems
• Development of a microcoded, prime-finite field accelerator that maintains re-
configurability via microcode programming while decreasing the energy per
digital signature
• Development of a binary-field accelerator that further reduces the energy of
asymmetric cryptography while outperforming prior work
• Evaluation of the energy benefit of an instruction cache in the context of asym-
metric cryptography
• Detailed hardware models and recommendations for future energy exploration
within the ultra-low energy domain
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2. BACKGROUND
In this chapter, we refresh the reader’s understanding of the relevant background
topics for this study. We start by reviewing basic cryptographic concepts and in-
troducing the mathematics that underpin all asymmetric cryptosystems. Then we
provide a brief primer on computer architecture in order to explain some of the termi-
nology referenced throughout this work. Finally, we review how energy is consumed
in digital circuits and discuss the relationship between power and energy. A reader
already familiar with these topics may skip this chapter.
2.1 Asymmetric Cryptography
The field of cryptography encompasses the techniques and mechanisms used to
communicate securely over an insecure channel. The primary objective is to encrypt
data prior to communication in such a way that it can only be decrypted by the
intended recipient. Consider the textbook scenario, depicted in Figure 2.1, where
Alice encrypts a plaintext message using her encryption key and sends the encrypted
data, also know as the ciphertext, to Bob over a public channel. Bob uses his
decryption key to translate the ciphertext back into plaintext. Along the way, the
data is intercepted by Eve, an eavesdropper; however, Eve is unable to recover the
plaintext message without Bob’s decryption key.
In cryptography, there are two distinct categories: symmetric and asymmetric.
Symmetric cryptography uses the same key for encrypting and decrypting data,
whereas asymmetric cryptography uses one key for encrypting and a separate key
for decrypting. By keeping one key private and making the other key publicly avail-
able, asymmetric cryptography (a.k.a public-key cryptography) can solve a host of
problems not possible with symmetric cryptography alone[12]. Classic schemes, such
6
Figure 2.1: Basic cryptography
as substitution ciphers, along with some modern encryption algorithms, such as DES
and AES, fall into the symmetric cryptography category. RSA and Diffie-Hellman
key exchange are examples of early asymmetric cryptography, while modern schemes
employ Elliptic Curve Cryptography, such as Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH)
key exchange and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature (ECDSA).
2.1.1 Confidentiality, Authenticity, and Integrity
Confidentiality refers to the protection of a message from eavesdropping, while
authenticity refers to trust in the origin of the message. Data integrity ensures the
message has not been modified, whether accidental or malicious. In an asymmet-
ric cryptosystem, each communicating entity has its own private/public key pair.
Then, depending on how the keys are used, asymmetric cryptography can provide
data confidentiality or authenticity/integrity. Figure 2.2a demonstrates the use of
asymmetric cryptography for confidentiality, while Figure 2.2b demonstrates its use
for authenticity/integrity. For confidentiality, Alice uses Bob’s public key to encrypt
a message and sends the resulting ciphertext to Bob who uses his private key to de-
crypt the ciphertext. In this scenario, only Bob’s private key can be used to recover
7
a message encrypted with his public key. Furthermore, Bob’s private key cannot
be derived from his public key. Even though the message is sent via an unsecured
channel, it is still protected from unauthorized access.
(a) Confidentiality
(b) Authenticity
Figure 2.2: Asymmetric cryptography for confidentiality or authenticity
For authenticity, Alice uses her private key to encrypt a message before she sends
it to Bob, who in turn uses her public key to decrypt the ciphertext. If the decryption
process yields an intelligible message, then Bob has high degree of confidence that
the message originated from Alice. Remember that only Alice’s private key could
have been used to encrypt a message that can be decrypted with her public-key.1 It
should be noted that tampering with the ciphertext will yield an unreadable message
after decryption, so data integrity is ensured as well.
Both confidentiality and authenticity can be achieved by encrypting first for con-
fidentiality and then again for authenticity. In which case, two encryption operations
1The underlying assumption here is that Bob is able to somehow authenticate Alice’s public key.
This is where certificates and the public-key infrastructure come into play.
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will be required on the sender’s side as well as two decryption operations on the re-
ceiver’s side. Likewise, both key pairs from Alice and Bob are required. In this
scenario, an adversary who stands between Alice and Bob can neither decipher their
communication nor successfully impersonate one or the other.
With the properties of confidentiality, authenticity and data integrity, asymmetric
cryptography can solve secret-key distribution problems. In order for two entities
to communicate securely using a symmetric cipher, they must somehow securely
exchange a shared secret key. Without asymmetric cryptography, this would require
an additional medium that can guarantee privacy; otherwise, an adversary could
discover the shared key and easily decrypt future communication. Moreover, large
key rings are required if a number of devices need to communicate securely. For
instance, n devices would require a total of n(n−1)
2
different secret keys, where each
device must store n− 1 keys [2].
With asymmetric cryptography, any two entities can easily and securely exchange
a temporary secret-key and then use symmetric cryptography to encrypt data traffic
for the remainder of the communication session. It should be noted that asymmetric
cryptography is ill-suited for bulk data encryption due to its high computational
cost. Thus, it is more energy efficient to amortize a key-exchange across a lengthy
communication session [13]. We will talk more about the protocols developed for
secure key exchange after delving into the mathematics.
2.1.2 The One-Way Function and Finite Fields
Improving the energy efficiency of an asymmetric cryptosystem requires an under-
standing of the underlying mathematics. Therefore, the following section will briefly
review the necessary mathematical concepts. At the core of asymmetric cryptog-
raphy is the mathematical one-way function with a trapdoor. A one-way function
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has a forward operation that is easy to compute but an inverse operation that is
considered computationally infeasible to compute. When a one-way function has a
trapdoor, certain knowledge can make the inverse operation also easy to compute
[14]. One-way functions for asymmetric cryptography are constructed using finite
fields, which are part of a division of mathematics known as abstract algebra. In
order to understand finite fields, we must first understand groups and rings.
A group, {G, •}, is a set (G) with a binary operation (•) and the following
properties:
• Closure, if a, b ∈ G, then a • b ∈ G
• Associative, a • (b • c) = (a • b) • c if a, b, c ∈ G
• Unit Element, there exists an element, e, such that a • e = e • a = a for all
a ∈ G
• Inverse Element, for all a ∈ G there exists an element a′ such that a • a′ =
a′ • a = e
If the commutative property, a • b = b • a for all a, b ∈ G, holds true, then the group
is an Abelian group.
A ring, {R,+,×}, is a set (R) with two binary operations (+,×) and the following
properties:
• R is an Abelian group with respect to +
• Closure over ×
• Associative over ×
• Unit Element with respect to ×
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• Distributive, a× (b+ c) = a× b+ a× c and (b+ c)× a = b× a+ c× a
If the commutative property holds true for ×, then the ring is commutative. Note
that the + and × operations are commonly referred to as addition and multiplication,
respectively.
A Field, {F,+,×}, is a commutative ring such that all elements except the ad-
ditive identity element (i.e., zero) in F have a multiplicative inverse element. For
multiplication, the inverse element of a is denoted by a−1. The inverse of a with
respect to addition is denoted by −a. In a field, the subtraction and division oper-
ations are derived from addition and multiplication by utilizing the inverse element
of the second operand, so the following holds true:
• a− b = a+ (−b)
• a/b = a× (b−1)
In other words, a field is a set of elements over which we can perform addition,
subtraction, multiplication and division; however, division by zero is not allowed. If
F is finite, then the field is referred to as a finite field.
2.1.3 Prime Fields and Modular Exponentiation
The modulo operation, a modulo p where a and p are integers, is equal to r such
that a = q ∗ p+ r for some value of q. The integers from 0 to p− 1 are known as the
set of residues modulo p. If p is prime and all arithmetic computations on the set of
residues are performed modulo p, the result is a prime field, denoted by GF(p).2 The
unit element with respect to addition for prime fields is 0, while the unit element for
multiplication is 1. The following are examples of GF(7) computation:
• Addition: 2 + 5 modulo 7 = 0
2GF stands for Galois Field and is named after the French mathematician, Evariste Galois.
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• Subtraction: 3− 6 modulo 7 = 4
• Multiplication: 5× 4 modulo 7 = 6
• Division: 2÷ 4 modulo 7 = 4
For division, if a, b, c ∈ GF (p), c = a ÷ b modulo p such that c × b ≡ a modulo p
and is found by first solving for b−1 modulo p then computing a× b−1 modulo p. It
should be noted that big integer division is extremely costly in terms of computation.
Thus, more efficient methods exist to perform the reduction operation (modulo p)
and compute the inverse (a−1 modulo p). We will discuss these methods in more
detail when we talk about the specific algorithms used in this study.
Traditional public-key cryptosystems such as RSA, Diffie-Hellman, and the Dig-
ital Signature Algorithm (DSA) utilize modular exponentiation (y = gx mod p) as
the one-way function [11, 15, 12]. The brute-force method for computing modular
exponentiation is to multiply g by itself x times, but far more efficient techniques
exist, such as the suite of repeated square-and-multiply algorithms [2]. Each square
or multiply in modular exponentiation is an operation performed over a finite field.3
Assuming a 4096-bit RSA algorithm, on the order of 1.5 ∗ 4096 field multiplications,
each of size 4096 bits, must be performed for each modular exponentiation. The
reverse operation, compute x given y, g, p, is referred to as the Discrete Logarithm
Problem (DLP) and is considered intractable as the size of the modulus increases.
Methods considerably more efficient than brute force exist for computing the DLP.
Thus, very large integers must be used to ensure security with traditional public-key
cryptosystems based upon modular exponentiation. As we will see shortly, more
efficient one-way functions exist, which allow computation over smaller fields.
3To be pedantic, the operations are over a multiplicative Abelian group because modular expo-
nentiation only uses multiplication.
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2.1.4 Binary Fields
Prime fields are commonly used for asymmetric cryptography, but when con-
sidering elliptic curves, other types of fields may be used as well. For finite-field
computations, the order does not necessarily have to be prime but must be a power
of a prime, e.g., GF(pm) where m is an integer such that m > 0, and p is the charac-
teristic of the finite field. If m > 1, polynomial arithmetic, such that the coefficients
are computed modulo p can be used.
Finite fields with a characteristic of 2, referred to as binary fields or GF (2m),
are especially attractive for custom hardware implementations because addition is
simply a bitwise XOR operation. Since multiplication is derived from addition,
the partial-product accumulation within multiplication is similar to that of integer
multiplication but without the carry logic. For this reason, binary-field arithmetic is
often called “carry-less” arithmetic.
Because we use polynomial arithmetic for binary-field computation, we borrow
the polynomial representation. As such, a GF (2m) field is denoted in the following
way: a(x) = am−1xm−1 + · · · + a2x2 + a1x + a0 where x is the indeterminate of the
polynomial, and the coefficients, am−1, · · ·, a2, a1, a0 ∈ [0, 1]. In a computer system, a
binary-field element is stored as an m-bit binary vector, (am−1, ···, a2, a1, a0). As with
prime fields, the result of a binary-field multiplication needs to be reduced. Binary-
field reduction is performed modulo an irreducible polynomial, f(x). Note that unlike
prime fields, binary-field addition and subtraction do not require reduction because
there are no arithmetic carries.
The following are examples of GF (27) computation assuming f(x) = x7 + x+ 1:
• Addition: (x6 + x4 + x3 + 1) + (x5 + x4 + x2 + 1) = x6 + x5 + x3 + x2
• Subtraction: (x6 + x4 + x3 + 1)− (x5 + x4 + x2 + 1) = x6 + x5 + x3 + x2
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• Multiplication: (x6 + x3 + x)× (x6 + x2 + 1) modulo f(x) = x3 + x+ 1
• Squaring: (x6 + x3 + 1)2 modulo f(x) = x5 + 1
Let us take a closer look closer at multiplication. First, we must perform polynomial
multiplication, such that the coefficients are computed modulo 2, as shown below:
(x6 + x3 + x)(x6 + x2 + 1) = x12 + x8 + x6 + x9 + x5 + x3 + x7 + x3 + x
= x12 + x9 + x8 + x7 + x6 + x5 + x
Then we reduce the result of the polynomial multiplication by dividing it by f(x)
and taking the remainder, i.e., compute modulo f(x). The necessary polynomial
division is shown below:
x5 +x2 +x +1
x7 + x+ 1
)
x12 +x9 +x8 +x7 +x6 +x5 +x
− x12 +x6 +x5
x9 +x8 +x7
− x9 +x3 +x2
x8 +x7 +x3 +x2
− x8 +x2 +x
x7 +x3
− x7 +x +1
x3 +x +1
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It should be noted that polynomial division is extremely costly in terms of com-
putation. Thus, more efficient algorithms exist to perform the reduction operation,
and we will elaborate on those algorithms in Section 4.2.
For the squaring example, we have the following:
(x6 + x3 + 1)(x6 + x3 + 1) = x12 + x9 + x6 + x9 + x6 + x3 + x6 + x3 + 1
= x12 + x6 + 1
= (x5)(x7) + x6 + 1
= (x5)(x+ 1) + x6 + 1
= x6 + x5 + x6 + 1
= x5 + 1
One thing to note is that most of the terms generated in the first step cancel out.
Mathematically, this can be explained by observing that
(a+ b)(a+ b) = a2 + (ab+ ab) + b2
where (ab + ab) equals zero because addition is an exclusive OR operation. This
concept can be extrapolated to more terms as shown below:
(a+ b+ c)(a+ b+ c) = a2 + b2 + c2
For this reason, binary-field squaring is much less computationally expensive com-
pared to binary-field multiplication.
Although the squaring algorithm for binary fields is fast, a reduction operation
must still be performed. Thus, the example above includes a glimpse of the afore-
mentioned fast-reduction techniques. In the fourth step, we are able to substitute
x+ 1 for x7 because of modular congruency shown below:
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x7 + x+ 1 ≡ 0 modulo f(x)
x7 ≡ x+ 1 modulo f(x)
Finally, it should be noted that although binary-field arithmetic can be efficiently
realized in hardware, some protocols, such as the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature
Algorithm (ECDSA) still require prime-field mathematics [16]. In the next section,
we will introduce a more efficient one-way function based on elliptic curves.
2.1.5 Elliptic Curve Cryptography
The Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) analog of modular exponentiation is
scalar point multiplication, which involves repeated addition-and-doubling of points
on an elliptic curve defined over a finite field. As with modular exponentiation, the re-
verse operation, known as the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP),
is considered intractable.
Elliptic curves are defined by a form of the Weierstraß equation. When prime
fields4 are used as the underlying field, K, the elliptic curve equation can be simplified
to the following:
E : y2 = x3 + ax+ b (2.1)
where a, b ∈ K and the discriminant, 4 = −16(4a3 + 27b2) 6= 0. For binary fields,
the simplified Weierstraß equation is given by:
E : y2 + xy = x3 + ax2 + b (2.2)
For cryptography, K is a finite field; however, for pedagogical purposes, it is
useful to view elliptic curves defined over the set of real numbers, K = R, as shown
in Figure 2.3. A graphical representations of point addition on an elliptic curve,
4 A prime field has a characteristic 6= 2, 3.
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Figure 2.3: Elliptic Curve point addition and doubling on E(R)
E(R), is depicted in Figure 2.3a. As shown, P and Q are added by first drawing a
straight line through the two points and then locating the third point of intersection
between the line, PQ, and the elliptic curve. The point, P + Q, is then the x-axis
reflection of the third point of intersection. For point doubling, shown in Figure 2.3b,
the x-axis reflection of 2P is the second point of intersection between the tangent
line of point P and the elliptic curve.
The set of points defined on the elliptic curve along with the point addition
operation form an Abelian group. The unity element for this Abelian group is the
point at infinity, ∞. When the line between two points is vertical, the third point
of intersection is said to be at infinity. Thus, P − P = ∞ where −P is the x-axis
reflection of P .
Mathematically, point addition and doubling for prime fields can be described by
the equations below such that A = (xa, ya), B = (xb, yb), and C = (xc, yc).
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• Addition:
xc =
(
yb − ya
xb − xa
)2
− xa − xb (2.3)
yc =
(
yb − ya
xb − xa
)
(xa − xc)− ya (2.4)
• Doubling:
xc =
(
3x2a + a
2ya
)2
− 2xa (2.5)
yc =
(
3x2a + a
2ya
)
(xa − xc)− ya (2.6)
Note that from Eq. (2.2), we can develop slightly different point addition and dou-
bling expressions for binary fields.
Just like modular multiplication and squaring are used by the modular exponen-
tiation algorithm, point addition and doubling are used for the scalar point multipli-
cation algorithm, which is the elliptic curve one-way function. Scalar point multipli-
cation, Q = xP , can be computed via the repeated point add-and-double method such
as right-to-left binary point multiplication described in Algorithm 1. The right-to-left
binary point multiplication algorithm is nearly identical to the algorithms used for
modular exponentiation, except square and multiply have been replaced with double
and add, respectively. It should be noted that Algorithm 1 is shown here purely
for example sake. Due to its simplicity, it is relatively inefficiently and susceptible
to side-channel attacks. In practice, more efficient sliding-window algorithms are
utilized, in which more than one bit of the multiplier is scanned at once [16].
As we can see from Eq. (2.3) to Eq. (2.6), each point operation requires a field
inversion, which can be up to two orders of magnitude more costly than a field
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Algorithm 1 Calculate Q = xP [16]
Input: P ∈ E(Fq) and integer x ≥ 1
Q⇐∞
while x 6= 0 do
if x is odd then
Q⇐ Q+ P
end if
x⇐ bx/2c
if x 6= 0 then
P ⇐ 2P
end if
end while
return Q
multiplication. Rather than using 2-dimensional, affine coordinates, we can use 3-
dimensional, projective coordinates. When using projective coordinates, intermediate
field inversions are not necessary. Instead, a conversion into projective coordinates
is performed at the beginning of a scalar point multiplication. Then throughout the
scalar point multiplication, projective coordinates are used, requiring no inversion
operations. Finally at the end of the scalar point multiplication, one inversion is
required to map the result back into affine coordinates.
Various projective coordinates have been proposed in literature; however, for
prime fields, Jacobian coordinates stand out as being the most computationally
efficient [16]. The mapping between Jacobian and affine points is (X, Y, Z) →
(X/Z2, Y/Z3) such that Z 6= 0, and the point at infinity is represented as (1, 1, 0).
To project an affine point onto a Jacobian point, we simply set Z = 1. However, to
convert a Jacobian point into an affine point, we must perform one field inversion
to calculate Z−1. For prime fields, the negative of a Jacobian point, (X, Y, Z), is
simply (X,−Y, Z). We can further improve the computational efficiency by using a
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mixture of Jacobian and affine points. In particular, we use Jacobian coordinates for
the point double operation, but when we perform a point addition, we actually add
an affine point to a Jacobian point.
For binary fields, Lopez and Dahab introduced a more efficient coordinate system
with the projective mapping of (X, Y, Z) → (X/Z, Y/Z2) and the point at infinity
being represented as (1, 0, 0) [17]. Because the additive inverse of an element in a
binary field is the element itself, the negative of a point is represented differently com-
pared to the prime counterpart. Specifically, in the Loped-Dahab (LD) coordinate
system, the negative of the point (X, Y, Z) is (X,X + Y, Z).
Determining the number of finite-field operations for ECC is not as straightfor-
ward as it is for modular exponentiation because each ECC addition and doubling
encompasses potentially dozens of finite-field operations. Given the same key size,
there is an order of magnitude more field operations for a typical ECC scalar point
multiplication compared to an RSA modular exponentiation, but the advantage of
elliptic curves over modular exponentiation for asymmetric cryptography is that the
ECDLP is considered to be computationally harder than the DLP. Consequently, the
size of integers used for ECC is much smaller than that of modular exponentiation-
based schemes of equivalent security. For this reason, ECC is substantially more
energy efficient than modular exponentiation schemes for the same level of security
and is the only asymmetric cryptosystem evaluated in this study [8, 13]. Given ex-
isting computational capabilities, integer computation in the range of 192-bits to
384-bits maintains adequate security for ECC. To provide similar levels of security,
RSA would need 1024-bit to 15360-bit computations [18].
The discussion here on elliptic curve cryptography is in no way intended to be
comprehensive. For a more in-depth treatment, we recommend two excellent books
dedicated to the subject, the “Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography” and the “Hand-
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book of Elliptic and Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptography” [16, 19].
2.2 HW/SW Codesign and Computer Architecture
The work presented here investigates the energy efficiency of asymmetric cryp-
tography on an ultra-low power embedded system. The term embedded system refers
to a special-purpose, System on a Chip (SoC), i.e., a small self-contained computer
system. An embedded system is comprised of two major design components, namely
hardware and software. The hardware is the tangible part, typically containing dig-
ital logic gates fabricated on a silicon substrate, while the software is the program
that orchestrates computation on the hardware. Often, these two components are de-
signed separately; however, hardware/software co-design can yield far more efficient
systems.
At the heart of any modern computer system is the processor core. Although
higher performance systems contain processors with multiple cores, we focus here
on a system with a single core. A typical processor core follows the stored-program
model, in which it sequentially fetches instructions from memory and performs arith-
metic and logic operations on data accordingly. The unit of data that is processed
by a given instruction is referred to as a word. Common word widths for modern
processors include 32-bits and 64-bits; however, some embedded systems use 8-bit
and 16-bit words. Data words can be stored in either memory or registers, the latter
having a much faster access time than the former. A register is nothing more than
a grouping of logic storage elements knowns as flip-flops. From the programmer’s
point of view, data and instructions are stored in the same memory but usually in
different locations, i.e., a Von Neumann architecture.
The Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) is the programmers interface to the pro-
cessor and essentially defines the hardware/software boundary. We can broadly cate-
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gorize an ISA into one of two categories: RISC or CISC. In a Reduced Instruction Set
Computer (RISC) architecture, instructions only perform operations on data within
registers. Therefore, data is loaded from memory into registers prior to computa-
tion and then stored back out to memory after computation. For this reason, RISC
architectures are synonymous with load-store architectures. A Complex Instruction
Set Computer (CISC) architecture, on the other hand, is a register-memory archi-
tecture, where instructions can operate on data in memory as well as in registers.
Common examples of a RISC architecture include MIPS, SPARC, PowerPC, and
the ubiquitous ARM, while well-known CISC architectures include Intel’s x86 and
Motorola’s 68000.
One of the primary advantages of a RISC architecture is that the instructions have
a simpler, fixed-width format and are therefore easier to decode in hardware. Coupled
with the load-store concept, a RISC machine is also easier to pipeline and hence a
good choice for an embedded system. This is especially true if code compatibility is
not a requirement, which means the designer is not forced to use a legacy CISC ISA.
For our work, we chose a subset of the MIPS ISA due mostly to its popularity in the
academic community but also partially because of being well supported in the GNU
toolchain.
The implementation of an ISA is commonly called the microarchitecture. An ISA
can have various microarchitectures depending on the generation of the machine and
the level of expected performance. For example, the R2000 and R3000 both imple-
ment the MIPS-I ISA; however the R3000 is an improvement over the R2000 [20].
Both machines are binary compatible, which implies a program does not have to be
modified to run on either machine.5 The field of computer architecture encompasses
5Binary compatibility does not necessary mean a program written for one machine will run well
on the other as a certain amount of machine-level software optimization might be present.
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microarchitecture design as well as ISA design. Although very little research today is
being put towards full ISA design, a hardware/software codesign project such as this
will often include both aspects of computer architecture by extending or enhancing
an existing ISA.
The microarchitecture of our research processor is based on the classic five-stage
pipelined processor taught in many computer architecture classes [21]. In such a
design, instruction execution consists of five stages, each normally requiring a single
clock cycle. The five stages are described below:
1. Fetch: An instruction is read from memory (or an instruction cache, which will
be discussed later), and the Program Counter (PC), which keeps track of the
processor’s place in the instruction sequence, is updated.
2. Decode: The instruction is decoded, creating control signals that will flow down
the pipeline, and the register file is read. Also, hazards (briefly discussed later)
are detected and handled.
3. Execute: This stage contains the Arithmetic-Logic Unit (ALU), which performs
an arithmetic or logic operation on the data read from the register file. If the
instruction is a load or store instruction, the memory address is calculated. If
the instruction is a branch instruction, which changes the control flow of the
program, the branch address is determined.
4. Memory: If the instruction is a load or store instruction, the memory (or the
data cache) is accessed. Instruction exceptions are also handled in this stage.
An exception interrupts normal program execution and can be caused by a
number things, including an unrecognized instruction, an arithmetic overflow,
or even an external notification.
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5. Write-Back: The register file is updated in this last and final stage. If the
instruction was a load, the value read from memory is written into the ap-
propriate register. If the instruction was an arithmetic-logic instruction, the
destination register is written.
In an in-order microarchitecture, instructions flow through the pipeline in pro-
gram order, ideally progressing to the next stage every clock cycle. This implies that
the ideal throughput of such a machine is one instruction per clock cycle (IPC = 1).6
Real processors, however, do not achieve ideal IPC due to hazards in the pipeline. A
hazard occurs when an instruction must stall because it depends on the results of an
instruction ahead of it in the pipeline. Hazards are a negative effect of instruction
execution overlap and must be handled properly to ensure correct execution. We
will now briefly describe the hazards possible in our 5-stage pipelined processor and
discuss how they are handled.
Three types of hazards exist in a traditional processor: data, control and struc-
tural. A data hazard exists when an instruction needs the result of another instruc-
tion ahead of it in the pipeline. In computer architecture terminology, this presents
a Read-After-Write (RAW) data hazard.7 Forwarding logic allows the pipeline to
continue without stalling in the case of back-to-back arithmetic-logic instructions so
long as each instruction only requires one clock cycle in the execute stage. However,
when an arithmetic-logic instruction immediately following a load instruction needs
the data being loaded, the pipeline must stall until the load is complete.8
A control hazard is caused by a branch instruction, which modifies the control
flow of the program. The problem is that the processor must update the PC in
6More aggressive microarchitectures fetch multiple instructions per clock cycle and execute them
out of order. These designs can achieve an IPC greater than one.
7Other types of data hazards exist but are not relevant for an in-order processor.
8Note that some literature uses the term interlocking to refer to pipeline stalling.
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the fetch stage, but the branch address is not determined until the execute stage.
Various techniques have been developed to reduce pipeline stalls caused by control
hazards, such as delaying the branch decision and predicting the branch outcome
early in the pipeline. The latter technique has proven useful in many microarchitec-
tures, while the former actually complicates the design of modern, more aggressive
microarchitectures.
In MIPS, the branch decision is delayed one clock cycle with a branch delay slot.
In other words, the instruction immediately following the branch in program order
is always executed, regardless of the outcome of the branch. To further reduce the
effects of control hazards, we use a simple branch predictor to predict the branch
outcome in the decode stage and then verify the prediction in the execute stage. If the
prediction was incorrect, the instruction that was speculatively fetched is invalidated,
and instruction fetch resumes at the correct branch target address. Of course, if the
prediction was correct, the processor simply continues execution uninterrupted.
A structural hazard exists when two or more instructions require the same hard-
ware resource in a given clock cycle. In an in-order, pipelined processor such as ours,
structural hazards only exist when a hardware resource is needed in two or more
pipeline stages. For instance, memory is accessed in the fetch and memory stage.
Similarly, the register file is read in the decode stage and written in the write-back
stage.
A simple solution to avoid memory structural hazards in a pipelined processor
is to store instructions and data in separate memories. This type of architecture,
commonly referred to as a Harvard architecture, is in contrast with the Von Neumann
architecture. Another solution is to provide multiple ports to the same memory. A
memory with two read/write ports is typically called a dual-port memory. One
disadvantage to such an approach is that the density of the memory goes down as
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the number of ports goes up (e.g., a single-port memory requires six transistors per
bit, while a dual-port memory requires eight). A third solution is to use separate
caches for data and instructions. While many embedded systems use a hybrid of the
aforementioned solutions, most computer system today use caches to solve memory
structural hazards. Structural hazards caused by the register file are usually avoided
with multiple ports. In particular, the register file in our processor has two read
ports and one write port.
Figure 2.4: The microarchitecture of a 5-stage pipeline processor
Putting all these concepts together, Figure 2.4 depicts the 5-stage pipelined pro-
cessor design used in our research. The forwarding paths for avoiding data hazards
are highlighted in green, while the signals for stalling and invalidating (i.e., flush-
ing) instructions are highlighted in red. The control signals that flow through the
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pipeline are colored blue and all other components of the datapath are colored black.
Note that the term datapath describes the data buses, registers, and arithmetic-logic
components within the microarchitecture.
For asymmetric cryptography, the width of the datapath (i.e., the word width),
specified by the ISA, can have a significant effect on the computational efficiency.
As seen in Section 7.9, larger datapaths prove to be beneficial in our accelerator
architecture. For MIPS-I and II, the datapath is 32-bits wide, while for MIPS-III
and above, the datapath increases to 64-bits. We currently utilize a 32-bit datapath
for our processor, but for future work, we would like to investigate the energy benefit
of using a 64-bit processor.
As will be discussed in Section 5.3, we investigate the energy impact of an instruc-
tion cache in our system. Thus, a brief description of caches is in order. We already
mentioned that caches can help eliminate structural hazards due to memory access,
but it is interesting to note that caches were developed primarily because the access
time of main memory was not keeping up with the speed of the processor. Starting in
the 1980s and continuing until about 2005, processor and main memory speed have
diverged exponentially [21]. Processor performance has increased drastically due to
advances in VLSI and computer architecture. Meanwhile, main memory speed has
been growing at a much slower rate as commodity DRAM capacity increases and
cost decreases.
To bridge this performance gap, computer architects began placing caches be-
tween main memory and the processor. Cache is simply smaller, faster memory that
leverages the principals of temporal and spacial locality. Temporal locality is the
observation that when an instruction or data word is accessed in memory, it is very
likely to be accessed again in the near future. Similarly, spacial locality observes
that when a word is accessed in memory, words within close proximity will likely be
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accessed as well.
By using faster SRAM technology, rather than slower, more dense DRAM, and
keeping the memory small, the access time for a cache can be orders of magnitude
less than that of main memory. Initially, processors only had a single level of cache;
however as the processor-memory performance gap continued to increase, more levels
of cache were added to the memory hierarchy. The access time of the lowest level of
cache, L1, must be matched with the speed of the processor, requiring only one or
two processor clock cycles. Moving up in the memory hierarchy, each level of cache
is larger and slower than the level below it. The goal of a well designed memory
hierarchy is to give the programmer the illusion of a single memory that is large
but also fast. While a typical computer system today will have up to three levels of
cache, many embedded systems only use one level of cache or no cache at all.
The simplest of all cache designs, illustrated in Figure 2.5, is the direct-mapped
cache.9 In such a cache, a block of data in main memory maps to only one location
in the cache. Because the cache is much smaller than main memory, many blocks
in memory will map to the same block in the cache. Consequently, a tag must be
stored with a given cache block in order to uniquely identify that block in memory.
In addition to the tag, other bits must be stored to keep track of the state of each
cache block. In our simple architecture, we only need to know if the cache block
contains valid data; thus a single valid bit is sufficient.
One of the advantages of a direct-mapped cache is simplicity. As shown in Fig-
ure 2.5, the word address from the processor is broken up into three components,
namely tag, index and block offset. The index is used to select a cache block from
the cache. Due to spacial locality, a cache block will usually contain multiple words
9Modern computer systems use more advanced caching techniques, which lie outside the scope
of this work.
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Figure 2.5: A direct-mapped cache with a block size of 16 bytes and a 32-bit word
width.
(a power of two for hardware simplicity). Thus, the block offset selects a particular
word within a cache block. To ensure the cache block referenced by the index is
the exact block in memory the processor is addressing, the tag stored in the cache
is compared with the tag portion of the address. Also, the valid bit is checked. If
the tags match and the valid bit is set, a cache hit is detected, and the appropriate
word is forwarded to the processor; otherwise, a cache miss is detected, causing the
cache controller to access the next level in the memory hierarchy. As a miss is being
handled, an in-order processor such as ours, must stall, waiting for the correct cache
block to be returned from the memory system. This wait time is commonly referred
to as the miss penalty. More details about the cache design used in this study can
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be found in Section 5.3.
2.3 Energy Consumption in Digital Circuits
Understanding how energy is consumed in CMOS logic is key to creating energy
efficient designs. The general equation for energy is given by
Energy = Power ∗∆Time (2.7)
such that Power is the average computation power, and ∆Time is the time per oper-
ation. While ∆Time is dependent upon the computation time, Power is dependent
upon the CMOS implementation and usage.
CMOS circuits dissipate power in three different ways. First, there is static power
dissipation, which can be described by the formula below:
Pstatic = V ∗ Ileak (2.8)
where V is the source voltage and Ileak is source to drain current when the transistor
is turned off, referred to as leakage current. The second type of energy consumption
is switching power, given by the following formula:
Pswitching = (1/2) ∗ α ∗ C ∗ f ∗ V 2 (2.9)
C is the capacitance the transistors must drive and is made up of wire and gate
capacitance. The clock frequency, f , and the switching activity factor, α, capture
the rate at which the transistors switch. The third component of power is short
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circuit power and is given by the following formula:
Pshort = V ∗ Isc (2.10)
Isc is the short circuit current which exists between the type N and P transistors
during a logic state transition [22].
In computing, we can reduce energy per operation by either reducing the power
consumed in the computation logic or by reducing the amount of time required per
operation. Often, a small increase in power can be traded for a significant reduction
in execution time such that there is an overall benefit in energy conservation [23].
Conversely, an increase in execution time might be traded for a significant reduction
in power as seen with Dynamic Voltage Frequency Scaling (DVFS) [24].
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3. RELATED WORK
Researchers have dedicated much effort to achieving significant acceleration using
hardware in FPGA and ASIC designs; however, only a few publications seem to
investigate the energy consumption aspect of public-key cryptography for embedded
devices. In order for public-key cryptography to be viable in energy-constrained
applications, a better understanding of the energy cost associated with asymmetric
encryption in both hardware and software is necessary.
Wander et al. compared the energy cost of 1024-bit RSA with that of 160-
bit ECC to show that 160-bit ECC significantly reduces energy consumption when
executed on an 8-bit Atmel ATmega128L microprocessor [8]. The results provide a
very compelling argument for ECC, showing that, based on an assumed battery life,
the device using ECC could execute 4.2 times the number of key exchange operations.
While their work looked at the energy cost for asymmetric cryptography on the far
left side of the range shown in Figure 1.1, our work examines its cost for additional
points on the spectrum.
Also on the far left of the spectrum, Potlapally et al. investigated the energy
requirements of OpenSSL on an Intel SA-1110 StrongARM processor [13]. To do
so, they devised a LabVIEW based testbed that measures, in real-time, the power
consumption of a handheld device with the SA-1110 processor. Their experimental
results motivate further research by showing that for 1KB data transfers, asymmetric
cryptography consumes greater than 90% of the total energy spent on cryptographic
processing. This equates to 56% of the total energy expended during the data trans-
fer. Additionally, they show that 163-bit ECC requires less energy than 1024-bit RSA
when client authentication is used. Their work is particularly relevant considering
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the SA-1110 is comparable in size to the processor evaluated in our study.
Pabbuleti et al. evaluated the energy cost of several public-key authentication
schemes based on ECC (ECDSA) and one-time hashes (LD-OTS and W-OTS) [9].
For their experiments, the authors used a CC2500 low-power RF transceiver paired
with an MSP430 microcontroller, 256 KB of flash and 16 KB of RAM. To facili-
tate independent energy measurements, the authors used separate shunt resistors to
measure the current independently through the microcontroller and the transceiver.
Thus, their evaluation included not only the cost of computing the signature, but
also the cost of transmitting the signature. While ECC based protocols require much
more energy for computation compared to the hash-based schemes, the hash-based
schemes require more energy for transmission because of longer signatures. Unfor-
tunately, the energy cost of computation for ECDSA does not scale well to greater
security levels. As a result, 160-bit ECDSA was shown to be more energy efficient
at the 80-bit security level compared to LD-OTS and W-OTS, but 256-bit ECDSA
was much less efficient at the 128-bit security level.
Keller et al. examined public-key energy consumption for FPGAs [25]. First, the
design of an entire asymmetric cryptographic processor is explained. Then, the design
is implemented on an Xilinx Spartan 3E FPGA and characterized in terms of en-
ergy consumption. The processor is capable of utilizing binary or prime finite-fields.
For prime-field mathematics, the authors used 192-bit integers, while for binary-field
mathematics, the authors used 163-bit polynomials. For energy consumption char-
acterization, the authors kept the bit lengths the same but made various algorithmic
changes. They found that the power consumption of the FPGA remained quite con-
stant throughout their experimentation, and thus, the fastest system configuration
was also the most energy efficient. In the design by Keller et al., the field size was
fixed at synthesis time, placing it on the far right of the spectrum of Figure 1.1. By
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contrast, the prime-field accelerator presented here is run-time configurable for up to
521-bit ECC. Furthermore, our work evaluates the energy cost for ASIC technology
as opposed to FPGA logic, which presents a significantly different power-performance
profile.
Goodman et al. compared public-key cryptography on a Domain-Specific Recon-
figurable Cryptographic Processor (DSRCP) with previously reported FPGA imple-
mentations and a software only implementation on a strongARM [26]. The DSRCP
was implemented in a 0.25 µm process technology, and the energy consumption
numbers were true measurements. The authors report orders of magnitude lower
energy consumption for the DSRCP compared to software and FPGA implemen-
tations. For public-key cryptographic algorithms, reconfigurability of the DSRCP
is possible, while the energy consumed by the DSRCP is half that of previously re-
ported non-reconfigurable hardware solutions. Because the DSRCP can only perform
public-key encryption, it lies on the right side of the diagram in Figure 1.1. Our work
investigates more reconfigurable points to the left on the diagram.
Wenger et al. compared 192-bit prime- and 191-bit binary-field implementations
of ECC in terms of energy consumption on a custom cryptographic processor[27].
Their results show that binary-field computation provides a 2.82 factor improvement
in energy efficiency for an ECDSA signature. Specifically, their custom processor,
“Neptun,” requires only 19.53 µJ for a 191-bit binary-field signature compared to
55.10 µJ for a 192-bit prime-field signature. Results were reported assuming a 1
MHz clock rate and a low-power 130 nm technology node. Even though each archi-
tecture was tuned for a particular field, the difference in power consumption between
the two is insignificant. Thus, the majority of the energy savings due to binary-field
support comes from a reduction in execution time. The authors attribute fast field
squaring and a 50% reduction in the number of field multiplications as the primary
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benefits of binary-fields. For an ECDSA verification, however, binary-field compu-
tation only provides a 1.49 factor improvement in energy efficiency because the twin
multiplication algorithm for verification is not as efficient for binary-fields. As with
the DSRCP by Goodman et al., the Neptun processor is designed specifically for
ECC but maintains a certain degree of reconfigurability. Our work not only investi-
gates more reconfigurable architectures but also covers a larger portion of the design
space by evaluating greater security levels.
For symmetric encryption, Wu et al. show a 2.25x performance improvement over
pure SW with CryptoManiac, which requires 1/100th of the area of an Alpha 21264.
Although the authors did not investigate energy, we acknowledge that this design
would yield a significant reduction in energy per symmetric cryptographic operation.
It should be noted that this work is complementary to ours because symmetric and
asymmetric cryptography are used cooperatively.
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4. ALGORITHMS AND SOFTWARE
4.1 ECDSA
In this study, we examine the energy cost for the Elliptic Curve Digital Sig-
nature Algorithm (ECDSA), which is a variant of the Digital Signature Algorithm
(DSA) that utilizes elliptic curve scalar point multiplication in place of modular
exponentiation [10]. We chose ECDSA as our benchmark because it is a standard-
ized elliptic curve-based algorithm found in many protocol implementations, includ-
ing OpenSSL [18]. Figure 4.1 depicts the computational hierarchy of ECDSA with
finite-field arithmetic at the foundation.
Figure 4.1: Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm computation hierarchy
Finite-field arithmetic is essentially addition, subtraction, multiplication, and
inversion on a finite set of elements. In terms of clock cycles per operation, field
inversion is the most costly, with multiplication coming in second. The number of
field inversions required is kept to a minimum, however, making multiplication the
most costly operation overall. Significantly, when we accelerate ECC, the finite-field
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arithmetic is the portion of the algorithm that gets mapped into hardware, while the
rest remains in software and is consequently reconfigurable.
Next in the computational hierarchy are the point addition and doubling algo-
rithms that perform mathematical operations on an elliptic curve over a finite field.
The underlying field can be either prime – GF (p) – or binary – GF (2m) – both of
which are endorsed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
Mathematically speaking, the point double and add operations constitute an Abelian
group with the points on the curve and a point at infinity (i.e., the identify element).
Although an elliptic curve is described in two dimensions with the Weierstraß equa-
tion, practical implementations use a three-dimensional coordinate system to avoid
costly field inversions. For ourGF (p) implementations, we use mixed Jacobian-Affine
coordinates, while for GF (2m), we use mixed Lopez-Dahab-Affine. These coordinate
systems are optimal in that they require the least amount of field operations for their
respective curves [16].
Continuing up the hierarchy, we have the scalar point multiplication algorithms.
ECDSA defines an operation for signing a message and another operation for ver-
ifying the signature of a message. Our study examines the energy cost of both in
order to understand the cost of an SSL handshake. An ECDSA signature requires
a single scalar point multiplication (X = kP ), while a verification requires a twin
scalar point multiplication (X = u1P + u2Q). For a single scalar point multiplica-
tion, we use a sliding-window algorithm that uses two pre-computed points (3P and
5P ) and takes advantage of the fact that point subtraction is only marginally more
costly than addition. For the twin scalar point multiplication, we use an algorithm
that pre-computes P −Q and P +Q and then simultaneously scans both multipliers
(u1 and u2). In such a case, the cost of a twin scalar point multiplication is less than
two single scalar point multiplication [28]. We evaluated Montgomery scalar point
37
multiplication for use with our binary-field coprocessor but found the algorithm to
be more costly in terms of performance and energy compared to the sliding-window
algorithm [17].
Encompassed within ECDSA is also arithmetic performed modulo the order of
the base point of the specified curve and is done in addition to the scalar point multi-
plications to complete either a signature or a verification operation. For most imple-
mentations, the scalar point multiplication constitutes the majority of the ECDSA
computation, but as will be shown later, this is not always the case with hardware
acceleration. For inversion modulo the group order, we implement the extended
Euclidean algorithm on Pete for all hardware/software configurations.
4.2 Multi-precision Routines
Because asymmetric cryptography involves computation on integers typically
much larger than the word width of the machine with which they are computed,
multi-precision routines are necessary to perform the finite-field arithmetic essential
for ECDSA. With multi-precision computation, large integers are stored in mem-
ory as arrays of w-bit words, where w is the width of the computational datapath.
Multi-precision computation then proceeds one word at time. For the architectures
evaluated in this study, w = 32. The size of the array necessary to store an n-bit
integer is given by k = dn/we. The computational complexity for the multi-precision
addition routines areO(k). In other words, the addition algorithm run time is linearly
related to the number of words required to represent the field. For multiplication,
the computational complexity is O(k2).
Of the multi-precision routines, inversion and multiplication have the highest
computational complexities; however, software acceleration techniques, such as the
use of three-dimensional coordinate systems, reduce the number of required inver-
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sions [29]. In terms of energy, multiplication is the most costly multi-precision rou-
tine. Therefore, we will begin by briefly reviewing the specific multi-precision mul-
tiplication algorithms used in this study. Because we evaluated the use of prime
and binary fields, our discussion will include both types of computation. For a more
in-depth coverage of the material presented in this section, consult Hankerson et
al. [16].
Algorithm 2 Operand scanning multiplication [30]
Input: A = (ak−1, ..., a1, a0), B = (bk−1, ..., b1, b0)
Output: P = A ∗B = (p2k−1, ..., p1, p0)
1: P ← 0
2: for i from 0 to k − 1 do
3: u← 0
4: for j from 0 to k − 1 do
5: (u, v)← aj ∗ bi + pi+j + u
6: pi+j ← v
7: end for
8: pi+k ← u
9: end for
4.2.1 Prime Field Multiplication
Prime-field multiplication requires a multi-precision integer multiplication fol-
lowed by a reduction operation to map the multiplication result back into the finite
field. Multi-precision integer multiplication can be broadly divided into two cate-
gories: product scanning and operand scanning. Operand scanning, described in
Algorithm 2, is the traditional “school-book” technique, also known as “pencil-and-
paper” multiplication. When implemented in software, operand scanning requires
a nested for-loop with the inner-loop iterating over the multiplicand and the outer-
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loop iterating over the multiplier. Within the inner-loop, the primary arithmetic
computation is given by
(u, v) = aj ∗ bi + pi+j + u (4.1)
assuming P = A ∗ B. In other words, operand scanning requires a succession of
multiply-add operations.
Algorithm 3 Product scanning multiplication [30]
Input: A = (ak−1, ..., a1, a0), B = (bk−1, ..., b1, b0)
Output: P = A ∗B = (p2k−1, ..., p1, p0)
1: (t, u, v)← 0
2: for i from 0 to k − 1 do
3: for j from 0 to i do
4: (t, u, v)← aj ∗ bi−j + (t, u, v)
5: end for
6: pi ← v
7: v ← u, u← t, t← 0
8: end for
9: for i from k to 2s− 2 do
10: for j from i− k + 1 to k − 1 do
11: (t, u, v)← aj ∗ bi−j + (t, u, v)
12: end for
13: pi ← v
14: v ← u, u← t, t← 0
15: end for
16: p2k−1 ← v
Product scanning, like operand-scanning, encompasses a nested-loop structure;
however, it iterates over the result array in the outer-loop and accumulates the
product terms within the inner-loop. For product scanning, described in Algorithm 3,
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the inner-loop computation is given by
(t, u, v) = (t, u, v) + aj ∗ bi−j (4.2)
such that (t, u, v) is the accumulator register set. In other words, product scan-
ning requires a succession of multiply-accumulate operations. Operand scanning
and product scanning require the same number of multiplications; however, when a
multiply-accumulate instruction is available, product scanning requires fewer adds
and stores to memory. If a multiply-accumulate instruction does not exist in the
target architecture, the multiply-accumulate operation must be emulated with mul-
tiplies and adds and uses additional registers, thereby diminishing the overall benefit.
For our baseline architecture, we found operand scanning to perform marginally bet-
ter than product scanning. For that reason, we used product scanning only in the
case of instruction set extensions.
A number of techniques exist for reducing the result of the multiplication (i.e.,
the modulo operation). The naive approach is to perform a multi-precision division
but is far too computationally intense to be considered in practice. Assuming the use
of general Mersenne primes selected by NIST, software routines can take advantage
of modular congruency in order to reduce a multiplication result using substitutions,
additions, and subtractions [31]. For example, consider the prime number used in
192-bit computations:
P192 = 2
192 − 264 − 1 (4.3)
Due to modular congruency,
2192 − 264 − 1 ≡ 0 (mod P192)
2192 ≡ 264 + 1 (mod P192)
41
In this manner, the upper 192-bits of the multiplication result can be folded
back into the lower 192-bits. The reduction algorithm for the NIST 192-bit prime
is described in Algorithm 4. For completeness, the other NIST primes used in this
study are listed below:
P224 = 2
224 − 296 + 1 (4.4)
P256 = 2
256 − 2224 + 2192 + 296 − 1 (4.5)
P384 = 2
384 − 2128 − 296 + 232 − 1 (4.6)
P521 = 2
521 − 1 (4.7)
Note that the terms of the NIST primes have been purposely selected to be
multiples of 232, making the reduction more efficient on a 32-bit processor.1
Algorithm 4 NIST fast reduction modulo P192 [31]
Input: C = (c5, c4, c3, c2, c1, c0)
Output: C modulo P192
1: s1 = (c2, c1, c0), s2 = (0, c3, c3), s3 = (c4, c4, 0), s4 = (c5, c5, c5)
2: T ← s1 + s2 + s3 + s4
3: while T ≥ P192 do
4: T ← T − P192
5: end while
6: return T
The drawback to fast reduction is that each field requires a unique NIST reduction
algorithm. As a consequence, the NIST reduction techniques are not recommended
for hardware implementations. Rather, the preferred method of reduction is Mont-
1This is with the exception of P521; however, the limited number of terms keeps the reduction
fast.
42
gomery reduction [32]. When Montgomery reduction is utilized, the reduction steps
can be interleaved with the multiplication steps to form Montgomery multiplication.
Koc¸ et al. provide a comprehensive examination of Montgomery multiplication, in
which the Coarsely Integrated Operand Scanning (CIOS) technique, described in
Algorithm 5, stands out amongst the rest [33].
The CIOS algorithm uses operand scanning for the multi-precision multiplica-
tion and coarsely integrates the Montgomery reduction into the multiplication by
performing the reduction on every iteration of the outer loop. The first inner loop
(lines 3-7) performs the operand-scanning multiplication, which will create a partial
product of length k + 1 words, while the second inner loop (lines 8-20) reduces the
partial product to k words. Thus, the final result is k words long and congruent to
A ∗ B ∗ R−1 (mod P ), where R = 2k∗w. A final correction step is then necessary to
ensure the result is less than the prime, P .
The primary advantage of Montgomery reduction is that the same algorithm
can be used for any arbitrary prime; only the algorithm parameters, such as word
length, must be configured. For our baseline architecture, we implemented the vari-
ous multiplication techniques in C++ and evaluated their performance with a 384-bit
ECDSA operation. The results showed operand scanning with NIST fast reduction
to perform the best with our given HW/SW architecture. We assumed power would
remain fairly constant across the various techniques, and therefore selected operand
scanning with NIST fast reduction for our baseline software suite.
The instruction set extensions (discussed in Section 5.2) were specifically de-
signed to allow computation with an accumulator, so we compared product scanning
with NIST fast reduction to the Finely Integrated Product Scanning (FIPS) Mont-
gomery multiplication using these enhancements. We found that product scanning
with NIST fast reduction outperforms FIPS. Thus, our ISA-extended microarchi-
43
tecture uses product scanning with NIST fast reduction for multiplication. For our
fully-accelerated microarchitecture (discussed in Section 5.4), we implemented CIOS
Montgomery multiplication in microcode.
Algorithm 5 Calculate t = MontMult(a, b, n, n′0) (CIOS) [33]
1: t⇐ 0
2: for i from 0 to k − 1 do
3: C ⇐ 0
4: for j from 0 to k − 1 do
5: (C, S)⇐ T [j] + A[j] ∗B[i] + C
6: T [j]⇐ S
7: end for
8: (C, S)⇐ T [k] + C
9: T [k]⇐ S
10: T [k + 1]⇐ C
11: C ⇐ 0
12: m⇐ T [0] ∗ n′0 modulo 2w
13: (C, S)⇐ T [0] +m ∗N [0]
14: for j from 1 to k − 1 do
15: (C, S)⇐ T [j] +m ∗N [j] + C
16: T [j − 1]⇐ S
17: end for
18: (C, S)⇐ T [k] + C
19: T [k − 1]⇐ S
20: T [k]⇐ T [k + 1] + C
21: end for
22: if t ≥ n then
23: return t− n
24: else
25: return t
26: end if
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4.2.2 Binary Field Multiplication
Algorithms 2 and 3 assume the target ISA has an integer multiply instruction that
performs 32-bit by 32-bit multiplication. Unfortunately for binary field-computation,
most processor architectures do not include a carry-less multiplication unit, which
drastically reduces the computational efficiency. The naive method for computing
binary-field multiplication without hardware support involves bit-serial multiplica-
tion such that the multiplier is scanned one bit at a time. In software, this algorithm
is impractical due to the cost of shifting and adding the multiplicand. More advanced
multiplication algorithms attempt to recover some lost efficiency via precomputation
[34]. In other words, some memory space must be traded for increased efficiency.
Algorithm 6 describes the binary-field multiplication used in our software-only
evaluation. W here refers the datapath width of the target machine, while w refers
to the window width of the algorithm. Window width, w, is the number of bits
of the multiplier that are scanned at a time, which dictates the amount of precom-
putation necessary. We found that w = 4 provides a reasonable balance between
precomputation storage and performance for an embedded system. Larger window
widths would speed up multiplication but require more RAM, thereby increasing
power consumption.
As will be discussed in Section 5.2.2, we have extended our target ISA to include
carry-less arithmetic instructions such that Algorithm 3 can be efficiently imple-
mented for binary fields. In such case, the need for precomputation is removed and
binary-field multiplication has a run time comparable to that of prime-field multi-
plication. A comparison of the energy per operation when using binary fields as
opposed to prime fields can be found in Section 7.3.
As with prime fields, binary fields have a set of NIST recommended fast reduc-
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Algorithm 6 Left-to-right comb method with windows of width W [16]
Input: a(x) and b(x) of degree at most m− 1
Output: c(x) = a(x) · b(x)
1: Compute Bu = u(x) · b(x) for all polynomials, u(x) of degree at most w − 1.
2: C ← 0
3: for j from (W/w)− 1 to 0 do
4: for i from 0 to k − 1 do
5: Add Bu to (C[k], C[k − 1], ..., C[j + 1], C[j]), where u = (uw−1, ..., u1, u0)
such that ul is bit (wj + l) of A[i]
6: end for
7: if j 6= 0 then
8: C ← C · xw
9: end if
10: end for
11: return C
tion algorithms. The follow trinomials and pentanomials are considered for binary
reduction polynomials:
f(x) = x163 + x7 + x6 + x3 + 1 (4.8)
f(x) = x233 + x74 + 1 (4.9)
f(x) = x283 + x12 + x7 + x5 + 1 (4.10)
f(x) = x409 + x87 + 1 (4.11)
f(x) = x571 + x10 + x5 + x2 + 1 (4.12)
Unfortunately, the terms in the reduction polynomials do not lie on word bound-
aries as is the case with the NIST primes. Thus, the reduction algorithms for binary
require a significant amount of additional shifting. For example, the reduction algo-
rithm for the 163-bit binary field is described in Algorithm 7. Because binary-field
computation does not need to deal with carries, the reduction time for binary is sim-
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ilar to that of prime, despite the extra shifting. In our work, we found the reduction
for P192 to take on average 97 clock cycles, while the reduction for B163 takes 100
clock cycles. As a comparison, the run time in clock cycles for Algorithm 3 using
ISA extensions is 374 and 376 for P192 and B163, respectively. For a listing of the
reduction algorithms for the other four binary fields, please see Hankerson et al. [34].
Algorithm 7 NIST fast reduction modulo f(x) = 2163 + 27 + 26 + 23 + 1 [34]
Input: c(x) of degree at most 324
Output: c(x) modulo f(x)
1: for i from 10 downto 6 do
2: T ← C[i]
3: C[i− 6]← C[i− 6]⊕ (T  29)
4: C[i− 5]← C[i− 5]⊕ (T  4)⊕ (T  3)⊕ T ⊕ (T  3)
5: C[i− 4]← C[i− 4]⊕ (T  28)⊕ (T  29)
6: end for
7: T ← C[5] 3
8: C[0]← C[0]⊕ (T  7)⊕ (T  6)⊕ (T  3)⊕ T
9: C[1]← C[1]⊕ (T  25)⊕ (T  26)
10: C[5]← C[5] & 0x7
11: Return(C[5], C[4], C[3], C[2], C[1], C[0])
4.2.3 Binary Squaring
One of the more significant advantages that binary-field computation offers is fast
squaring. As shown in Section 2.1.4, the result of a binary square operation is simply
the result of squaring the individual terms in the input polynomial. In a computer
system, this can be accomplished by inserting zeros between the bits of the input
operand as illustrated below:
(am−1, · · ·, a2, a1, a0)→ (am−1, 0, · · ·, 0, a2, 0, a1, 0, a0)
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For our software-only system, the binary-field squaring algorithm is accelerated with
a precomputed table of 8-bit polynomials and associated 16-bit squares. The algo-
rithm then scans the input operand 8-bits at a time, using each 8-bit window to
reference the table. For our ISA-extended system, the carry-less multiplier is used
in lieu of a table, allowing for a 32-bit window when squaring.
As with multiplication, the result of a square operation is reduced using the NIST
fast reduction algorithms. The computational complexity of these optimized squaring
algorithms are O(k) as opposed to O(k2), making binary-field squaring significantly
faster than multiplication.
4.2.4 Field Addition/Subtraction and Inversion
Modular addition and subtraction with prime and binary fields have a computa-
tional complexity of O(k), and therefore, have a minimal impact on the efficiency of
ECC. Consequently, we will only briefly discuss the algorithms used.
For both prime and binary fields, addition is performed by breaking up the ad-
dends into words (i.e., the datapath width) and performing addition at the word
level (i.e., multi-precision). Prime-field computation requires integer addition, which
means arithmetic carries must be properly handled between word boundaries. Also,
arithmetic overflow is possible, so a reduction step is necessary after a prime-field
add. The reduction step for addition is simply a condition subtraction of the prime
modulus from the result. Prime-field subtraction is similar to addition in which a
conditional integer addition of the prime follows a subtraction. For binary-fields,
there are no arithmetic carries, which means no reduction step is necessary, and
addition and subtraction are the same operation [16].
Field inversion is typically performed with variations of either the extended Eu-
clidean algorithm or Fermat’s little theorem. The extended Euclidean algorithm uses
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shifts, additions, and subtractions and is O(k2), while Fermat’s little theorem uses
modular exponentiation and is O(k3). Although its computational complexity is
lower than Fermat’s little theorem, the extended Euclidean algorithm is more chal-
lenging to implement in hardware. Thus, we implement field inversion with Fermat’s
little theorem on our Monte and Billie accelerated architectures and the extended
Euclidean algorithm on the rest [16].
4.3 Software Build/Run-time Environment
We used crosstools-ng 1.18.0 to compile our build environment, which includes the
GNU Compiler Collection (gcc) 4.7.2 and Binutils 2.23. The executable binaries used
for our evaluation were compiled with -O2 and statically linked to Newlib. Unless
stated otherwise, the algorithms mentioned here were developed in C++. For the
instruction set extensions in Section 5.2 and coprocessor instructions in Section 5.4,
we modified the mips-opc.c source file to include these supplementary instructions
and recompiled Binutils.
The run-time environment for our study was a bare-metal (i.e., no OS) environ-
ment representative of a low-power, embedded microcontroller with minimal memory
configuration. Instructions and initialization data are read directly out of ROM. A
minimal amount of RAM is supplied for stack, heap, and miscellaneous data sections.
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5. MICROARCHITECTURES
As discussed in Chapter 3, a significant amount of research and development has
been put towards accelerating asymmetric cryptography. As a result, a number of
specific microarchitectural enhancements have been proposed in literature. In this
study, we evaluate the energy benefit of a few of these enhancements across the spec-
trum illustrated in Figure 1.1. We will now describe the evaluated microarchitectures
in detail, starting with our baseline.
5.1 Baseline
The baseline architecture we modeled, depicted in Figure 5.1, consists of a RISC
processor with 256KB of program ROM and 16KB of RAM. The ECDSA software,
including the necessary C++ libraries, requires just under 128KB of program mem-
ory. Thus, we assume an additional 128KB remains for other embedded system
functions. Also, our baseline system does not include an instruction cache. Our ini-
tial thoughts were that an instruction cache would be more costly in terms of energy,
but as we will see later, we discovered this was not the case.
The RISC processor, from here on referred to as “Pete,” is a classic, five-stage,
pipelined processor without a Memory Management Unit (MMU). Pete executes a
subset1 of the MIPS-II Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) [20]. The program ROM
has a 32-bit, dual-port interface to allow simultaneous access for Pete’s instruction
and data bus. Note that the data bus requires access to the program ROM be-
cause the processor must initially copy the data portion of the program into RAM.
Moreover, we make use of C++ virtual functions in our software, which require an
1The MIPS R© unaligned load and store instructions as well as floating point instructions and
those related to memory management are not included in Pete’s ISA.
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occasional table look-up. The RAM in the baseline system is assumed to have only
a single 32-bit interface for Pete’s data bus because instructions will not be stored in
RAM. For both memories, we assume single-cycle access. The clock rate we selected
for our evaluation has a period of 3 ns, which is greater than the access time required
for all memories, including the program ROM.
Figure 5.1: Baseline: RISC Processor w/ ROM and RAM
5.1.1 Statically Scheduled Multiply
One particularly unique characteristic of the MIPS ISA is the Hi/Lo register set
used for storing multiplication and division results. The use of these registers al-
lows the multiply/divide hardware to lie outside of the integer pipeline, as shown
in Figure 5.1, and therefore operate in parallel with the integer pipeline. For those
unfamiliar with this concept, consider the assembly code below:
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1 mult $t0 , $t1 #i n i t i a t e t0 ∗ t1
#other independent i n s t r u c t i o n s
3 #may be p laced here . . .
mflo $t2 #s to r e lower 32− b i t r e s u l t in t2
5 mfhi $t3 #s to r e upper 32− b i t r e s u l t in t3
The mult instruction initiates the multiplication of t0 by t1, while the mflo and
mfhi instructions store the lower and upper parts of the 64-bit result, respectively.
Therefore, instructions independent of the multiply can be statically scheduled be-
tween the mult and mflo/mfhi instructions. This feature is especially useful for
hiding the cost of loop maintenance for tightly-nested arithmetic loops. The multi-
precision integer algorithms required for asymmetric cryptography particularly ben-
efit from this light instruction-level parallelism.
Fast, parallel multiplication found on many high-performance RISC cores is costly
in terms of area and power [35]. To alleviate the cost of Pete’s 32-bit multiplier, we
designed a multi-cycle multiplication unit using only a single half-word parallel multi-
plication block. After examining the assembly output for our multi-precision integer
routines, it became clear to us that the compiler effectively schedules instructions
to take advantage of the instruction-level parallelism that this architecture can pro-
vide. For this reason, we were able to increase the multiplication latency to four
clock cycles without significantly affecting the execution time of the multi-precision
multiplication routines.
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5.1.2 Karatsuba Multiplier Implementation
To further reduce dynamic power, we based our multi-cycle multiplication unit
on Karatsuba’s divide-and-conquer technique, described by Großscha¨dl et al. [36].
P =(AH ∗BH) ∗ 2n
+ [(AH − AL) ∗ (BL −BH)] ∗ 2n/2
+ (AL ∗BL)
(5.1)
Equation 5.1 expresses Karatsuba multiplication mathematically, such that P is the
product and AH , AL, BH , BL represent the input operands, A and B, split into
high and low parts. The principal advantage of Karatsuba multiplication is that
only three half-word multiplications are needed, as opposed to four with operand
or product scanning methods. It should be noted that the term enclosed by square
brackets in (5.1) can be less than zero, so Karatsuba multiplication introduces signed
arithmetic within an unsigned computation. If the multiplication unit is expected
to handle signed as well as unsigned multiplication, which was the case for our
work, then this will not require an exorbitant amount of extra logic when compared
to other techniques. Figure 5.2 depicts the multi-cycle multiplication unit used in
our baseline architecture. As shown, the primary arithmetic components of our
Karatsuba multiplier include a 17-bit by 17-bit signed parallel multiplication block,
a four-port 49-bit adder, and two 16-bit subtraction units.
Although integer division is not necessary for the algorithms used in this study,
we included a small divider in our evaluation. We found that it was necessary for
debugging and felt it might be necessary in some of the aforementioned application
areas. Moreover, Pete’s integer divider uses a simple binary restoring technique,
so it consumes only a small percentage of the overall logic resources and does not
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Figure 5.2: The Karatsuba Multiply Unit within the baseline architecture.
significantly impact energy consumption [35].
5.2 ISA Extensions
Instruction set extensions are special purpose instructions built into an existing
ISA in order to enhance the execution of a particular algorithm. For many applica-
tions, including DSP, communications, and cryptography, these special purpose in-
structions have shown considerable speedup with very little additional overhead. We
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consider instruction set extensions a “middle-of-the-spectrum” acceleration technique
and therefore feel they warrant consideration in our comparison study. Großscha¨dl
et al. extensively explored the use of instruction set extensions for public-key cryp-
tography on various RISC platforms, including MIPS and SPARC V8 [36, 30]. Their
research covers both GF (p) (prime finite fields) and GF (2m) (binary finite fields). In
our work, we started with support for only GF (p) and then added GF (2m) support
later [37].
Table 5.1: Instruction set extensions for prime fields. Adapted from the work of
Großscha¨dl et al. [30].
Format Operation
MADDU rs, rt (OvFlo, Hi, Lo) ← (OvFlo, Hi, Lo) + rs * rt
M2ADDU rs, rt (OvFlo, Hi, Lo) ← (OvFlo, Hi, Lo) + 2 * rs * rt
ADDAU rs, rt (OvFlo, Hi, Lo) ← (OvFlo, Hi, Lo) + (rs << 32) + rt
SHA (OvFlo, Hi, Lo) ← (OvFlo, Hi, Lo) >> 32
5.2.1 Prime Fields
For prime fields, Großscha¨dl et al. recommend four supplementary instructions
for accelerating all variations of product scanning multiplication (e.g., Comba and
FIPS). These instruction set extensions are summarized in Table 5.1. One thing
to note is the expansion of the Hi/Lo register set to include a third 32-bit register
referred to as the OvFlo register. Those familiar with the MIPS ISA might notice
that the maddu instruction is actually available in later versions of the MIPS ISA.
The difference here is support for higher precision accumulate operations necessary
for product scanning multiplication. The M2ADDU instruction is an optimization
specifically for squaring, while the addau instruction improves the performance of
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the FIPS Montgomery multiplication algorithm and potentially the NIST reduction
algorithms. The SHA instruction is needed for all variations of the product-scanning
algorithm and facilitates access to the OvFlo register [30].
The suggested ISA extensions needed only a minimal amount of modification to
our baseline microarchitecture. Aside from extra decode logic in the main pipeline,
most of the modifications were concentrated within the Karatsuba multiplication
unit. For example, the four-port adder was widened to 50-bits, and extra internal
carry bits were added. The multiplexing logic was modified to support extra data
paths from the result registers (for accumulate) and the operand registers (for the
ADDAU instruction). Additionally, result shifting and stores into the OvFlo register
were added. Figure 5.3 depicts Pete’s multi-cycle multiply-accumulate unit with the
ISA extension modifications highlighted. It should be noted that the multiplication
block remained untouched.
5.2.2 Binary Fields
Recall from Section 2.1.4 that binary-field arithmetic is essentially carry-less com-
putation, i.e., add is simply a bitwise XOR. Because most instruction sets include
an XOR instruction and carry-less addition does not require a reduction operation,
binary-field addition in software is much faster than its prime counterpart. Unfor-
tunately, the same is not true for multiplication because most instruction sets do
not include support for a carry-less multiplication. Consequently, computationally
inefficient methods such as Algorithm 6 must be utilized for binary-field multipli-
cation. As will be shown in the next chapter, this fact alone renders software only
implementations of binary-field ECC impractical for most embedded processors. In
such a case, ISA extensions can provide a dramatic improvement.
For binary-field support, Großscha¨dl et al. recommend only two additional in-
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structions, summarized in Table 5.2. The first instruction, mulgf2, is a 32-bit by
32-bit carry-less multiply, i.e., the binary-field equivalent of the mul instruction in
MIPS. Notice that we represent this operation with ⊗. The second instruction, mad-
dgf2, is a carry-less multiply-accumulate instructions, i.e., the binary-field equivalent
of the maddu instruction in Table 5.1. Here we use ⊕ to mean binary add.
As with prime ISA extensions, we had to modify Pete’s instruction decode unit
and the Karatsuba multiply-accumulate unit. The modifications to the Karatsuba
multiply-accumulate unit are highlighted in Figure 5.4. The most notable change
is the inclusion of a 16-bit by 16-bit carry-less multiplication unit. Rather than
overcomplicating the design with a signed multiplication block that also supports
carry-less multiply, we chose to multiplex between the two multiplications units de-
pending on the computation mode. This decision was partially influenced by our
FPGA prototyping. In an FPGA, integer multiplication is made efficient via hard-
ware multiplication blocks built into the reconfigurable logic. However, an unusual
multiplication unit that also supports carry-less multiply would not synthesize to
these built-in primitives. We even experimented with various lightweight parallel
multiplication techniques in a Virtex-5 but found them to be far too costly in terms
of FPGA resources to be practical.
For the four-port addition unit, we designed a dual-mode adder that supports
normal addition and carry-less addition. We used a similar design for the 16-bit
subtraction units at the top of Figure 5.4. Fortunately, no other modifications to the
datapath were required. For the top-level FSM, we had to add a control signal that
selects the correct computation mode.
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Table 5.2: Instruction set extensions for binary fields. Adapted from the work of
Großscha¨dl et al. [30].
Format Operation
MULGF2 rs, rt (OvFlo, Hi, Lo) ← rs ⊗ rt
MADDUGF2 rs, rt (OvFlo, Hi, Lo) ← (OvFlo, Hi, Lo) ⊕ rs ⊗ rt
Figure 5.3: The Karatsuba Multiply-Accumulate Unit including support for prime-
field ISA extensions. The dashed lines represent data paths that have been added
or modified to accommodate these ISA extensions. Lightly shaded boxes signify
modified components, while darkly shaded boxes indicate additional components.
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Figure 5.4: The Karatsuba Multiply-Accumulate Unit including support for prime-
and binary-field ISA extensions. Lightly shaded boxes signify modified components,
while darkly shaded boxes indicate additional components.
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Figure 5.5: The implementation of a direct-mapped instruction cache. Notice the
tag and data are stored in different memories. Also, the valid bits are stored with
the tag.
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5.3 Instruction Cache
A surprising result we encountered while evaluating our baseline microarchitec-
ture is the significant energy cost for instruction fetch from the program ROM.
Three factors contribute to the relatively high energy cost of instruction fetch. First,
a RISC processor such as Pete fetches an instruction from memory on every clock cy-
cle, causing a large number of reads from program ROM. Second, the energy cost per
read of a memory is dependent on the size of memory, so larger memories consume
more energy. Finally, compared to the other memory components in the system, the
program ROM is the largest by far.
In an effort to reduce this energy cost, we first modeled our system with an
ideal 4KB direct-mapped instruction cache, using energy estimates from Cacti, a
cache modeling tool developed by HP Labs [38]. In the ideal case, the instruction
cache never misses, so the energy cost for instruction fetch only considers reads
from the cache. Although this scenario is unrealistic, it provides a simple way of
estimating the best case energy benefit we could expect from adding an instruction
cache. Our preliminary results, discussed in detail in Section 7.5, showed close to a
50% improvement in overall energy with an ideal instruction cache for the baseline
and ISA extended microarchitectures. The Monte accelerated architecture, which
will be discussed next, showed far less improvement because instruction fetch is far
less dominant in terms of energy.
5.3.1 Cache Implementation
Next, we designed a real instruction cache in Verilog. We chose to implement the
simple direct-mapped cache, conceptually described in Figure 2.5. The cache blocks
in our design hold four 32-bit words each, i.e., are 16 bytes wide. The number of
cache lines, however, is parameterizable, which allows us to change the size of the
61
cache prior to synthesis. The hardware block diagram for our cache is depicted in
Figure 5.5. In the conceptual diagram, an entire cache line, which includes the valid
bit, tag and data block, is stored in a single memory. However, in practice, the tag
and data components of a cache line are typically stored in separate memories. One
advantage of using separate memories for tag and data is that the data memory can
also select the appropriate word. In other words, the data memory and word-select
multiplexor shown in the conceptual diagram can be combined. Because memories
are custom designed, rather than synthesized, this results in a faster, more efficient
cache. Another motivation for separating out the tag and data is that in a more com-
plex system, such as a multi-core processor system, the tag must be read more often
than the data.2 In such cases, the tag memory is either dual-ported or duplicated
altogether.
In Figure 5.5, we show the processor core interface at the top and the interface to
ROM at the bottom. The instruction address from the processor is broken up into
three components: tag, index, and block-offset. The data memory is addressed with
a concatenation of the index and the block offset, while the tag memory is addressed
with just the index. A cache hit is detected by comparing the address tag to the
tag read from the tag memory, i.e., the cache line tag. If the tags match and the
valid bit is set, a hit is signaled to both the cache controller and the processor. In
the case of a hit, the processor will assume the instruction being read from the data
memory of the cache is correct and will begin fetching another instruction. Likewise,
the cache controller will remain idle. In the case of a miss, the processor will stall
the front end of the pipeline (commonly referred to as a pipeline slip), and the cache
controller will begin access to the program ROM. Once the appropriate memory
block has returned from the program ROM, the cache line will be stored in the
2More tag reads are required for cache coherency protocols [21].
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cache, overwriting the existing cache line. In our implementation, this is carried out
with the write-enable signals going from the cache controller to the cache memories.
After the store operation is complete, the hit signal will be updated and the processor
will continue fetching.
Figure 5.6: Pete with an instruction cache. Notice the interface to the program ROM
has been increased to 128-bits.
5.3.2 System Integration
The simplified top-level microarchitecture with the instruction cache is shown in
Figure 5.6. Not only did we add an instruction cache, but we also expanded the
program ROM port to 128-bits, which allows an entire cache line to be filled at once.
In an SoC, the program ROM is fabricated on the same silicon die as the processor
logic, making wider ports to memory far less expensive in terms of energy compared
to off-chip memory. The primary advantage of a 128-bit program ROM port in
our system is a decrease in the miss penalty, which ultimately decreases the energy
wasted while Pete is waiting for the correct cache block. To reduce the number of
wires and further reduce the cost of ROM access, we made the ROM single-ported.
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The changes to the ROM interface and the inclusion of an instruction cache
require a slightly more complicated memory system. The data bus from Pete still
needs 32-bit access to the program memory. Likewise, we have to support instruction
access to non-cached regions in memory. When a processor system is brought out of
reset, the cache is in an unknown state and therefore unusable until the processor
initializes it. This implies that the reset vector (the location in memory where the
processor begins fetching instructions after reset), must be in a non-cached region of
memory. At the end of the reset routine, the instruction cache is initialized, which
involves invalidating each entry in the cache. From there, the processor jumps to
the pre-main routine in the cached address space, where it begins initializing the
software environment.
To make all this work, we added data and instruction buffers to transition from
a 128-bit memory port to a 32-bit bus. Furthermore, we included arbitration in our
ROM controller in order to multiplex the single port. This means that the data
and instruction buses as well as the instruction cache must content for access to the
program ROM. Although this presents a structural hazard in our system, it has no
noticeable impact on performance once the software system has been initialized.
5.3.3 Prefetching
In addition to different cache sizes, we also considered prefetching in our energy
evaluation. In the context of caching, prefetching is a technique that attempts to
reduce cache misses by speculatively fetching cache lines from main memory just
prior to their use. A perfect prefetcher would always fetch the correct cache line
early enough so that it is ready for use when the processor needs it and would
not fetch caches lines that are not used. Fortunately, instruction access is largely
sequential, which means it exhibits a lot of spacial locality and is therefore easy to
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predict. Thus, prefetching improves the performance of our instruction cache and
has the potential to save energy in the process.
We implemented a simple prefetching technique similar to the stream buffer pro-
posed by Norman Jouppi [39]. The stream buffer takes advantage of pipelined mem-
ory systems by prefetching a stream of cache lines rather than just one at a time.
Our prefetcher is essentially a single-entry stream buffer because we assume non-
pipelined access to the program ROM. It works as follows: When the cache detects a
miss, the cache controller will read the requested cache block from ROM and place it
in the cache as normal. Then it will immediately read the next block in the address
space and place it in a prefetch buffer along with a tag that identifies that particular
block. For every instruction reference from the processor, the address tag is also
compared to the tag in the prefetch buffer. If there is a miss in the cache but a hit
in the prefetch buffer, then the prefetch buffer will forward the requested block to
the processor and write it into the cache at the same time. The cache controller will
simultaneously read the next block from ROM and place it in the prefetch buffer. As
long as the prefetch buffer always contains the next need cache block, the processor
never has to stall. Also, the prefetch buffer avoids polluting the cache with blocks
that may never get used.
5.4 Prime-field Accelerator
Continuing towards the right of the spectrum shown in Figure 1.1, we augmented
our microarchitecture with an accelerator designed specifically for GF (p) arithmetic.
Figure 5.7 depicts the top-level diagram of our microarchitecture with the GF (p)
accelerator, referred to as “Monte,” on the left, the memory in the center, and Pete
on the right. Similar to work described by Koschuch et al. [40], Pete and Monte
utilize a shared memory interface in order to reduce any bottlenecks that might be
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Figure 5.7: The prime field accelerated architecture, “Pete with Monte.”
Table 5.3: Coprocessor 2 Instructions used to control Monte
Format Description Operation
CTC2 rt, rd Move to Control Register cop2CR[rd] ← GPR[rt]
COP2SYNC CoProcessor 2 Sync Sync Operation
COP2LDA rt Load A into Operand Buffer OpBuff[A] ← MEM[GPR[rt]]
COP2LDB rt Load B into Operand Buffer OpBuff[B] ← MEM[GPR[rt]]
COP2LDN rt Load N into Operand Buffer OpBuff[N] ← MEM[GPR[rt]]
COP2MUL Modular Multiply ResultBuff ← A * B mod N
COP2ADD Modular Add Result ← A + B mod N
COP2SUB Modular Subtract Result ← A - B mod N
COP2ST Store Result into Memory MEM[GPR[rt]] ← ResultBuff
created with a bus interface. Hence, we extended the 16KB of RAM found in our
baseline architecture to a true dual-port memory to which both Pete and Monte can
read/write.
5.4.1 Coprocessor Interface
To coordinate communication between Pete and Monte, we use the coprocessor
interface defined in the MIPS architecture; specifically we modified Pete to include
Coprocessor 2 instructions (Table 5.3) for the command and control of Monte. The
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first instruction, ctc2, allows Pete to initialize the control registers within Monte.
As will be discussed later, these control registers allow run-time configuration of the
algorithms executing within Monte. The second instruction, cop2Sync, facilitates
synchronization between Pete and Monte, typical of any parallel processing system.
Instructions cop2ldA, cop2ldB, and cop2ldN initiate Direct Memory Access
(DMA) transfers from shared memory to operand buffers within Monte. The start
address in shared memory of A, B, and N is contained within Pete’s General Pur-
pose Register (GPR) rt. Instructions cop2mul, cop2add, and cop2sub initiate
modular multiply, add, and subtract, respectively. The result of the above com-
putation instructions is copied back into memory by the cop2st instruction, which
initiates a DMA transfer from the result buffers within Monte out to shared mem-
ory. It should be noted that the above instructions are multi-cycle instructions with
latencies dependent on the size of the finite field.
The instructions described in Table 5.3 are fetched and decoded by Pete as regular
instructions. Within the decode stage, they are identified as coprocessor instructions
and are forwarded to Monte when they reach the execute stage. As shown in Fig-
ure 5.7, instructions are placed within an instruction queue once passed to Monte
and decoded in instruction order. Similar to out-of-order execution, the coprocessor
instructions are dispatched to one of two functional units. The Finite-Field Arith-
metic Unit (FFAU), described in detailed shortly, is responsible for modular addition,
subtraction, and multiplication, while the DMA handles data movement between the
FFAU buffers and shared memory. The loading of operands and storing of results
are overlapped with computation via a double buffering scheme. Similarly, operand
data is buffered separately from result data to increase buffer bandwidth and avoid
unnecessary stalls in the arithmetic logic, while at the same time not demanding
more ports per buffer. To reduce the number of reads from shared memory, we have
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included forwarding paths from the result buffer to the operand buffer. Consider the
snippet of code below to understand how Monte reorders instruction execution:
1 #assume monte i s i n i t i a l l y i d l e . . .
cop2ldA $a1 #load A from address GPR[ a1 ]
3 cop2ldB $a2 #load B from address GPR[ a2 ]
cop2ldN $a3 #load N from address GPR[ a3 ]
5 cop2mul #A∗B mod N
cop2st $a0 #must wai t u n t i l mul done
7 #in s t r u c t i o n s be low do not depend on prev ious
cop2ldA $t0 #can run ahead o f s t o r e !
9 cop2ldB $t1 #same here
cop2add #A+B mod N
11 cop2st $t3 #must wai t u n t i l add i s done
cop2ldA $t3 #must be forwarded during s t o r e
13 cop2ldB $s0 #can run ahead o f s t o r e
cop2sub #A−B mod N
At line 2, the load instruction will be immediately dispatched to the DMA and a
transfer will be started during the next clock cycle. Meanwhile, the next instructions
will be queued because the instruction at line 3 is not able to dispatch until the
current DMA transfer is complete. After instruction 4 dispatches, a DMA transfer
will be started and instruction 5 will dispatch to the FFAU. Instruction 5 will not
issue (i.e., start execution) until the current DMA transfer has completed. Once
instruction 4 finishes, Monte will swap operand buffers, and instruction 5 will begin
executing. At the same time, instruction 6 will dispatch to the DMA, where it
will wait in a reservation register until instruction 5 completes. Note that the DMA
functional unit contains a reservation register for stores. Loads, however, are initiated
upon dispatch, so a reservation register is not necessary.
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Instruction 6 will wait in the store reservation register until instruction 5 com-
pletes. In the mean time, instructions 8 and 9 will be processed while instruction
5 continues to execute. The multiply is an expensive operation, so instruction 10
will be held up in the instruction queue until the multiplication completes. When
instruction 5 finally finishes, the result buffer will be swapped, and instruction 10
will be dispatched. On the next cycle, instruction 10 will begin because its operands
have already been loaded, and instruction 6 will begin storing the multiplication
result out to memory. Once instruction 6 has completed, the store instruction at
line 11 can dispatch into the reservation register, where it will wait until the add
completes. In the meantime, instruction 12 will dispatch. Now, instruction 12 will
cause a Read-After-Write (RAW) hazard with instruction 11. Instead of executing
instruction 12, a forwarding bit in the DMA unit will be asserted, and instruction
12 will be discarded. Instruction 13 will then dispatch and begin a transfer on the
next clock cycle because it does not pose a RAW hazard. Once instruction 10 and
13 complete, the DMA will begin storing the add result out to shared memory, while
at the same time, copying the data into operand A. Instruction 14 will dispatch but
cannot start until the store has completed the forwarding operation.
5.4.2 Prime-field Arithmetic Unit
For accelerating prime finite-field arithmetic, we designed a microcoded Finite-
Field Arithmetic Unit (FFAU). A zoomed in view of the FFAU in Figure 5.8 reveals
that the major components of our accelerator include an arithmetic core, multiplex-
ing logic, address logic, and a control unit. The arithmetic core is a flexible, 2-stage
pipelined multiply-add unit, which is capable of performing various combinations of
adds and multiplies depending on input control bits. Flip-flops within the arithmetic
core store intermediate carries to allow for efficient pipelining of the back to back
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multiply-adds required by the multi-precision arithmetic. The address logic is noth-
ing more than a few index registers, which generate the operand and result addresses
in parallel with the computation. The multiplexing logic provides the FFAU with
enough flexibility to compute the CIOS Montgomery multiplication algorithm.
The control unit contains a 64-entry microcode table, along with built-in hard-
ware for nested loop structures and other conditional branches. In an attempt to
balance the trade-off between performance and reconfigurability, the control unit
contains a set of control registers, programmable by the ctc2 instruction. Precom-
puted algorithm parameters as well multi-precision integer width must be preloaded
into Monte prior to use. A return address register has been included to allow sub-
routine calls (leaf functions only). The following sections will describe the design of
our FFAU in more detail.
Figure 5.8: The Finite-Field Arithmetic Unit at the center of “Monte”
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The intent of the FFAU is to accelerate the underlying mathematics required
for ECC. In order to fully explore the design space associated with this sort of
acceleration hardware, the HDL code has been written such that the width of the
data path and the size of internally addressable memory can be adjusted prior to
logic synthesis. Other design parameters such as the size of the microprogram can
be adjusted as well. However, for the analysis provided in this study, those design
parameters are held constant unless stated otherwise.
5.4.2.1 Hardware Design
The microarchitecture depicted in Figure 5.9 is capable of executing CIOS Mont-
gomery multiplication, described in Algorithm 5, along with modular addition and
subtraction. Recall from Section 4.2.1, the CIOS algorithm consists of two nested
for-loops. The first loop computes the following:
t = t+ a ∗B
such that t is an integer with a word length of k + 2, a is an integer with a word
length of k, and B is of unity word length and part of b, an integer of the same size
as a. Note that if l is the bit length of the finite-field elements (e.g., 192, 256, or 384)
and w is the bit width of the datapath, then k = l/w. For example, if we want to
process 192-bit integers (minimal security) with a 32-bit datapath, then each integer,
a and b, will be represented by k = 6 words. The second inner loop computes the
following:
t = t+m ∗ n
such that t is as previously defined and n is an integer of k words. m is a single
word value computed just prior to its use on every iteration of the outer loop. In
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Figure 5.9: Top Level Architecture of the FFAU
short, the computation in each of the inner loops involves a multiplication of a large
integer by a single word and the addition of another large integer.
At the center of the FFAU is the arithmetic core. It is capable of clocking in
three w-bit operands and clocking out one w-bit result on every clock cycle. For the
current design, the arithmetic core has two pipeline stages and uses parallel array
multiplication and Carry Save Adder (CSA) row reduction techniques. While it
achieves a throughput of one operation per clock cycle, each operation has a latency
of three cycles. Table 5.4 reveals a subset of the operations the arithmetic core is
capable of performing.
Note that Result is the lower w bits of the computation and Carry is the remain-
ing upper w bits of the computation. The arithmetic core is self draining, meaning
that the control bits from the control unit as well as the store address for the corre-
sponding result propagate through the pipeline, along with the operand data. This
greatly simplifies the required control logic.
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Table 5.4: Arithmetic Core Computational Capabilities
Multiply-Add
(Carry,Result)⇐ A ∗B
(Carry,Result)⇐ A ∗B + C
(Carry,Result)⇐ A ∗B + C + Carry
Add-Subtract
(Carry,Result)⇐ A+B
(Carry,Result)⇐ A+B + C
(Carry,Result)⇐ A+B + C + Carry
(Carry,Result)⇐ −A+B
(Carry,Result)⇐ −A+B + C
(Carry,Result)⇐ −A+B + C + Carry
Clear Pipe
(Carry,Result)⇐ C + Carry
(Carry,Result)⇐ Carry
The key to an efficient design is near 100% utilization of the arithmetic core. In
order to avoid pipeline stalls, three w-bit operands must be fetched from internal
scratchpad RAM, while one w-bit result is stored on every clock cycle. To allow for
the use of dual port RAMs, the memory within the FFAU is split into two memory
modules. The AB memory holds the a, b, and n integers, while the T memory holds
the intermediate result, t. Since the AB memory must hold three k-word integers,
the minimum size of the AB memory is 3k words. For design simplicity and future
expansion, both the AB and T memories were designed to be 4k deep. It should
be noted that this liberal use of memory will only slightly exaggerate the energy
consumption of the FFAU, but for future work, the memory size will be re-examined.
The AB memory requires two read ports, and at least one of those ports must support
write operations in order to load the input data. The T memory module requires
only one read port and one write port for the internal FFAU architecture.
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Result data from the arithmetic core can be stored in either the T memory
or a temporary result register. Part of the control data that propagates with the
computation is the write-enable signal for the T memory module and the load signal
for the temporary result register. The A input to the arithmetic core is multiplexed
to allow input from either the AB memory module or the temporary result register.
The temporary result register is necessary to avoid a structural hazard that would
otherwise exist during the reduction step of the CIOS algorithm when computing
t = t + m ∗ n. Thus, m is stored in the temporary result register during reduction,
thereby allowing the architecture to simultaneously access m and t. As with the A
input, the B input of the arithmetic core is multiplexed, enabling multiplication by
a value from an 8-entry, microcode-selectable RAM module within the control unit.
For the calculation of m, a constant must be pre-loaded into the constant RAM.
The address generation logic is responsible for addressing the read ports for both
memory modules. An index register is dedicated to each read port and can be
independently controlled using the binary codes found in Table 5.5. The width of
the index registers is determined by the depth of the RAM modules, log2(4k), and is
automatically set prior to logic synthesis. The constant bus referenced in the table
is fed by the constant RAM module within the control unit. The write port on
the T memory module is addressable only by the store address pipeline within the
arithmetic core. The store address along with the control signals latched into the
arithmetic core on every clock cycle is supplied by the control unit.
The FFAU control unit, depicted in Figure 5.10, is a microcoded state machine.
It has two additional index registers for handling nested loops, a small RAM for
holding constants, a return address register for simple subroutines, and a command
decoder for supporting multiple operations. The control unit is also capable of mak-
ing branch decisions within a microprogram based on signals from the datapath. As
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Table 5.5: Index Register Control Codes
Code Operation Description
00 Hold no change to value
01 [reg]←const bus load register with value on constant bus
10 [reg]← 0 clear register value
11 [reg]← [reg]+1 increment register value
Figure 5.10: The Control Unit within the FFAU
seen in Figure 5.10, the CIOS algorithm requires a minimal amount of decision logic.
Currently, the microcode ROM is 64 entries deep, which was more than enough to
implement the CIOS algorithm, along with modular addition and subtraction.
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5.4.2.2 Design Trade-offs
Even though this study was tailored for energy efficient finite-field arithmetic,
many of the lessons learned here can be applied to the acceleration of other algo-
rithms. During the design of the FFAU, a number trade-offs were encountered, such
as the trade-off between reconfigurability and efficiency. As more logic is added to
the design to support a wider variety of algorithms, the amount of logic being ef-
fectively utilized for a given algorithm decreases. If the accelerator is being tuned
for a specific algorithm, one would want to provide just enough reconfigurability in
the design to allow for a certain amount of scalability and not much more. After
all, if reconfigurability is the primary design objective, the use of a general purpose
processor should be considered.
To accommodate expansion and dynamic configuration of key size, i.e., the size
of the underlying finite field, the FFAU pulls array bounds from the constant RAM
within the control unit. For this design, the use of microprogramming over hard-
coding the control unit is preferred in order to improve reconfigurability and reduce
control unit complexity. In this case, the control complexity is moved into the mi-
croprogram; however, a good microcode assembler can help improve the situation.
It should be noted that combining a microcoded control unit with a constant RAM
allows for two levels of reconfigurability and reduces the cost associated with the
control store.
Scalability versus efficiency is another trade-off encountered in this study. Con-
sequently, the FFAU is only scalable up to a certain point determined by the size of
scratch memories. The approach for determining memory size taken here is to look at
the largest practical problem size for which this device might be used. Unfortunately
for cryptographic applications, the problem size grows as new attack algorithms are
76
developed. A complexity versus performance trade-off exists when considering the
use of the temporary result register. At the cost of additional multiplexing logic and
a control signal, a structural hazard is avoided, thereby reducing potential pipeline
stalls. It should be noted that another solution to the aforementioned structural
hazard is to add a third port to the AB memory; however, this could negatively
effect the scalability of the design.
The aforementioned trade-offs were discussed somewhat independent of the algo-
rithm complexity, but when considering area versus performance, it is beneficial to
examine the computation time in terms of input size. For example, the number of
clock cycles required to complete a CIOS operation on the FFAU is as follows:
cc = 2k2 + 6k + (k + 1)p+ 22 (5.2)
where k is the word length of the field, and p is the latency of an arithmetic core
operation and is directly related to the depth of the pipeline. Optimizations that
reduce the coefficients of higher ordered terms in the complexity equation should be
prioritized for both energy efficiency and performance. Hence to reduce the coefficient
of the quadratic term, the FFAU has logic for scratchpad address generation that is
separate from that of the actual computation. Likewise, the memories are organized
such that three operands can be read at once, rather than stalling while waiting for
a third operand to be read from memory.
Another interesting trade-off that is quantified in (5.2) is clock rate versus pipeline
depth. In this preliminary study, this trade-off was not really considered; instead, a
depth which provided a reasonable clock rate with minimal logic optimization was
chosen. However, assuming an ideal increase in clock rate due to pipelining, it is
fairly straightforward to calculate an optimal pipeline depth for the FFAU using
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(5.2). Obviously, the effect that p has on performance will be algorithm specific. In
this situation, there is a data dependency within the outer loop of the CIOS algorithm
that requires a pipeline stall, hence the coefficient, k. The +1 comes from the fact
that the pipeline must drain before the final result is available. It should be noted
that the data dependency could be removed at the cost of microcode complexity.
5.5 Binary-field Accelerator
As previously discussed, binary fields, GF (2m), are advantageous in the fact that
addition does not require carry propagation. Thus, custom hardware implementa-
tions can perform addition over the entire length of a field element without a signif-
icant impact on clock rate. This lends itself to computationally efficient digit-serial
multiplication with field-specific reduction [41]. Furthermore, binary-field squaring
can be performed simply with a handful of XOR gates when the binary field is fixed
[16]. Therefore, we designed and evaluated a non-configurable, GF (2m) accelerator
for further energy efficiency. Figure 5.11 shows the top-level diagram of “Billie,” the
binary accelerator, with Pete.
Figure 5.11: The binary-field accelerated architecture, “Pete with Billie”
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Table 5.6: Coprocessor 2 Instructions used to control Billie
Format Description Operation
COP2SYNC CoProcessor 2 Sync Sync Operation
COP2LD rt, fs Load into Billie Register BR[fs] ← MEM[GPR[rt]]
COP2ST rt, fs Store into Memory MEM[GPR[rt]] ← BR[fs]
COP2MUL fd, fs, ft Modular Multiply BR[fd] ← BR[fs] × BR[ft]
COP2SQR fd, ft Modular Square BR[fd] ← BR[ft]2
COP2ADD fd, fs, ft Modular Add BR[fd] ← BR[fs] + BR[ft]
5.5.1 Coprocessor Instructions
Prior research has suggested that the control of the binary-field accelerator can
significantly limit performance [42]. Thus, Billie utilizes the MIPS coprocessor in-
terface for command and control to reduce this potential bottleneck. In such cases,
Pete fetches binary-field instructions and feeds them directly to Billie at a high rate.
Similar to the configuration with Monte, Pete and Billie share the dual-port RAM to
eliminate inefficiencies caused by processor-to-accelerator data transfers. Table 5.6
lists the instructions added to Pete’s ISA in support of the binary-field coprocessor.
The cop2sync instruction was previously discussed in Section 5.4 but listed here for
completeness.
Billie is a load-store architecture, so cop2ld and cop2st are used to move data
to and from her 16 entry register file. Specifically, cop2ld loads a multi-precision
field element from memory starting at the address referenced by the rt GPR into the
Billie Register (BR) specified by fs.3 Conversely, cop2st stores a field element from
the fs BR into memory starting at the address referenced by the rt GPR. Continuing
the load-store concept, the binary-field arithmetic instructions pull input data from
and write results back into Billie’s register file. For multiplication and addition,
3The General Purpose Registers (GPRs) are part of Pete’s register file.
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cop2mul and cop2add follow the three-operand instruction format such that fs
and ft are the input operands, and fd is the result operand. Because squaring is a
unary operation, the cop2sqr instruction only requires a two-operand format such
that fs is the input operand, and fd is the result operand.
5.5.2 Microarchitecture
For a preliminary evaluation, we based Billie on the NIST 163-bit binary field.
A zoomed in view of the microarchitecture is illustrated in Figure 5.12. From a high
level, our design for Billie takes a similar approach to the original IBM 360 floating
point unit [43]. Notable features include an instruction queue, register file, load/store
unit and separate functional units for multiplication, squaring and addition.
Figure 5.12: Billie’s coprocessor architecture.
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Coprocessor instructions fetched by Pete are first buffered in Billie’s four-entry
instruction queue. This avoids stalling Pete while the longer-latency binary-field
instructions execute. When an instruction is at the head of the queue, the logic
decodes it and checks for structural and data hazards. A structural hazard exists
when the appropriate functional unit is currently busy, while a data hazard exists
when the input operands have not yet been stored in the register file. If no hazards
exist, the operands will be read from the register file, and the instruction will dispatch
to the corresponding functional unit. On the next clock cycle, the instruction will
begin executing and once complete, will remain in the functional unit until the
result has been written back into the register file. In this architecture, reads from
the register file are prioritized over writes. Thus, write-back of the result will occur
when an instruction is not being dispatched.
To reduce structural hazards, the register file has two read/write ports (i.e., true
dual port). The data paths between the register file and the functional units are 163
bits wide. Multiple functional units require write access to the register file, so the
port multiplexor must also perform arbitration. We chose a simple scheme in which
each functional unit is statically assigned a port for writing into the register file. For
instance, the multiplier and squaring unit both share a port, while the adder and
load/store unit share another. If both functional units assigned to the same port are
ready to write during a given clock cycle, the arbiter will allow one to write and stall
the operation of the other. For simplicity, the priorities of each functional unit are
fixed. In our design, the multiplier and adder have higher priority over the squaring
and load/store units, respectively.
The register file contains sixteen, 163-bit registers to accommodate all interme-
diate computations for a scalar-point multiplication. Because we use sliding-window
algorithms that leverage some precomputation, we require twice the number of reg-
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isters as compared to Guo et al. [42]. However, as will be shown in Section 7.6, the
extra registers yield a significant performance advantage and have the potential to
save energy. The load/store unit is responsible for transferring binary-field elements
between Billie’s register file and shared memory. The interface to shared memory is
32-bits wide, while the interface to the register file is a field width (e.g., 163-bits for
this particular configuration). Thus, the load/store unit serves as a buffer between
these two mismatched ports and is analogous to Monte’s DMA unit.
5.5.3 GF (2m) Arithmetic Units
For GF (p) computation, the propagation of arithmetic carries from the least sig-
nificant bit position to the most within multiplication and addition typically becomes
the clock-rate limiting critical path. From an implementation stand point, full field-
width GF (p) computation is impractical. Thus, field elements are broken up into
smaller words, and computation proceeds at that granularity (i.e., multi-precision).
For GF (2m) computation, carry propagation does not exist, so full field-width ad-
dition is possible and advantageous. Compared to multi-precision computation, full
field-width GF (2m) arithmetic requires less complex logic and scales more easily
to increasing field widths. The hardware scalability is a consequence of data-level
parallelism afforded by the carry-less computation.
The addition and multiplication units within Billie take advantage of this par-
allelism by performing addition over an entire m-bit binary polynomial in a single
clock cycle. Because addition is fast, we employ digit-serial multiplication that iter-
ates over the multiplier, shifting and adding the multiplicand into an accumulator,
accordingly [35]. Specifically, Algorithm 8 describes the multiplication operation in
detail, where a(x) is the multiplicand, b(x) is the multiplier, c(x) is the accumulator,
and D is the digit width. As shown, Step 1 zeros out the accumulator. Initially,
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Step 3 multiplies the least significant digit of the multiplier (B0) by the multiplicand
and adds the result to the accumulator. Concurrently, Step 4 shifts the multiplicand
D bits to the left and reduces the result modulo f(x), the irreducible polynomial.
Note that this algorithm integrates the polynomial reduction into the multiplication.
Steps 3 and 4 repeat with the next significant digit of the multiplier until the mul-
tiplication is complete. The final step reduces the m + D − 1 result to m-bits with
f(x).
Algorithm 8 Digit-serial GF (2m) multiplication [41]
Input: a(x) =
∑m−1
i=0 aix
i, b(x) =
∑dm
D
e−1
i=0 Bix
D·i
Output: c(x) = a(x) · b(x) mod f(x) = ∑m−1i=0 cixi
1: c(x)← 0
2: for i from 0 to dm
D
e − 1 do
3: c(x)← Bi · a(x) + c(x)
4: a(x)← a(x) · xD mod f(x)
5: end for
6: return c(x) mod f(x)
For squaring, we employ field-specific hardware that takes advantage of fast bi-
nary squaring discussed in Section 2.1.4 and incorporates the reduction operation.
As an example, Figure 5.13 depicts a hardwired squaring unit for GF (27) assuming
f(x) = x7 + x+ 1.
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Figure 5.13: Binary-field squaring unit, s.t. f(x) = x7 + x+ 1 [16]
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6. METHODOLOGY
We developed fully synthesizable Verilog models for the baseline processor (“Pete”),
ISA-extended processor, and the Finite-Field Accelerator (“Monte”). Front-end syn-
thesis was used to construct the arithmetic components, including the 17-bit by 17-bit
multiplication blocks within Pete, and the 32-bit multiply-add unit within Monte.
Post-synthesis power estimations for core logic on a 45 nm technology node with
a 333MHz clock were performed using Synopsys Prime-Time, a timing and power
analysis tool for CMOS logic [22, 44].
To estimate memory power, we used counters to keep track of the number reads
and writes to and from the memories embedded within the testbench, and we used
Cacti to extract estimates of energy per read/write and leakage power [38]. Unfor-
tunately, no equivalent tool for estimating ROM power exists. As a conservative
estimate, ROM dynamic power was assumed to be equivalent to a comparably sized
RAM, while ROM static power was assumed to be zero.
Each cryptographic operation requires millions of clock cycles and is arduous to
simulate post-synthesis. For power estimations using the techniques discussed above,
we simulated a portion of the algorithm representative of the entire algorithm. To
measure execution times, we emulated each microarchitecture using Verilator, a fast,
two-state Verilog HDL simulator [45].
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7. EVALUATION
7.1 Prime Fields
Figure 7.1 summarizes our results for prime fields by graphing the energy per
operation (a signature followed by a verification) for each of the evaluated microar-
chitectures vs. key size. These results confirm each configuration’s placement in the
diagram in Figure 1.1 and show that special purpose hardware becomes much more
attractive as greater security requirements are demanded. For GF (p) ISA exten-
sions, we observe between 1.32 to 1.45 factor improvement in energy efficiency over
baseline, while for GF (p) acceleration with Monte, we observe a 5.17 to 6.34 factor
improvement. A point in between is the microarchitecture with ISA extensions and a
4KB instruction cache. For such a system, we see a 1.67 to 2.08 factor improvement
in energy compared to baseline.
Furthermore, we observe that the energy consumed increases quite rapidly as the
key size is increased. Examination of the data reveals the increase is substantially
greater than quadratic for the pure software configuration, while for the microar-
chitecture with ISA extensions, the increase is closer to quadratic. The effect of
key size is much more gradual for the energy consumed by the fully accelerated
microarchitecture, coming in just slightly less than quadratic for 192-bit to 256-bit
key sizes. After 256-bit, key size appears to have a greater effect on the accelerated
architecture. This may be due to our choice of algorithm for inversion within Monte
(Fermat’s Little Theorem), which has a O(n3) computational complexity. We plan
to further investigate this issue.
Figure 7.2 displays a side-by-side comparison of the energy, broken down into sub-
components, consumed per 192-bit and 256-bit operation vs. microarchitecture. The
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Figure 7.1: Energy per Sign + Verify vs. key size and microarchitecture for prime
fields.
results show that a significant portion of the energy consumed by the baseline and
ISA extended microarchitectures is spent in the ROM. In these microarchitectures, an
instruction must be read nearly every cycle; therefore, the ROM is kept very active.
We found that this is a common theme amongst low-power embedded processors [46].
We also note that the ROM energy is much less when Monte is in use. In such
case, Monte’s microcode ROM is producing most of the instructions so the ROM
activity factor is dramatically lowered. For the hardware configuration with a 4KB
instruction cache, we see that a significant portion of the ROM energy is traded for
additional energy in the uncore portion of the system. Here we use the term uncore
to refer to the instruction cache, program ROM controller, and the instruction and
data buffers (discussed in Section 5.3) as well as miscellaneous multiplexing logic
for the program ROM and the RAM. It should be noted that the instruction cache
will improve the energy of the entire software system and not just the cryptographic
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Figure 7.2: Breakdown of energy per Sign + Verify for 192 and 256-bit key sizes into
various sub-components.
algorithms we evaluate here.
Another interesting observation that can be made in Figure 7.2 is that the en-
ergy consumed in the RAM decreases as the level of acceleration increases. This is
partially due to reduced execution time decreasing the amount of energy spent on
leakage power but primarily due to the fact that each acceleration technique aims
to reduce access to memory. For example, product scanning used with the proposed
instruction set extensions requires fewer stores than operand scanning. Similarly,
Monte utilizes smaller, internal buffers and data forwarding to reduce accesses to
shared memory. The instruction cache, however, does not significantly affect the
RAM energy as seen by comparing the ISA extension microarchitectures with and
without the instruction cache.
For further examination, Figure 7.3 shows the energy consumption broken down
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Figure 7.3: Energy per Sign + Verify vs. key size for our baseline with no hardware
acceleration.
into sub-components for the baseline across the five prime fields recommended by
NIST. Figure 7.4 shows the same for the ISA extended microarchitecture and the
microarchitecture with Monte. For the baseline and ISA extended architectures, the
processor core (i.e., Pete) energy changes mostly with execution time, as the power
remains fairly constant while varying the key size. For instance, from 192-bit to
521-bit, Pete’s power goes up by only 6% in the baseline configuration. The change
in core power for the ISA extended microarchitecture was even less.
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            For the Monte configuration, Pete’s power drops considerably (≈23%) compared 
to baseline and continues to decrease as key size is increased. This decrease is because 
Pete spends a significant amount of time stalled, while Monte performs the majority of 
the computation. Even while stalled, however, Pete is still the dominant energy consumer 
as shown in Figure 7.4b. After close examination of the power breakdown provided by 
Synopsys, it became clear that the dominant contributors to Pete’s power is the clock 
network and registers, which still have a high activity factor while stalled.
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(a) ISA extended
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(b) W/ Monte
Figure 7.4: Energy per Sign + Verify vs. key size for the ISA extended microarchi-
tecture and the architecture accelerated with Monte.
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7.2 Binary Fields
While prime fields have a longer history of use, binary fields have been shown to
offer a performance benefit and have a potential energy benefit as well [30]. Thus,
we also evaluate the use of binary fields for ECDSA in our energy study. We start
out with a software-only implementation on our existing microarchitecture, using
Algorithm 6 with w = 4 and the fast reduction routines discussed in Section 4.2.
Then we augment our microarchitecture with binary support by including carry-less
multiply and multiply-accumulate instructions. Figure 7.5 compares our estimated
energy consumption for the microarchitectures with and without binary support for
the 5 NIST recommended binary fields.
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Figure 7.5: Energy per Sign + Verify vs. key size for binary fields.
As shown in Figure 7.5, the software without binary support is less energy efficient
than the ISA extended version by a factor of 6.40 to 8.46. When a carry-less multiplier
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is not part of the microarchitecture, the computational complexity for binary-based
ECC is much higher because the multiplication must be emulated with shifts and
adds. As a result, we do not recommend the use of binary fields without hardware
support. For further evaluation, Figure 7.6 depicts the energy breakdown of a sign
and verify operation for binary field ISA extensions across the NIST fields.
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Figure 7.6: Energy per Sign + Verify vs. key size for binary ISA extensions.
7.3 Prime Fields vs. Binary Fields
In the ISA extended microarchitecture, binary fields have the advantage of carry-
less add and a less computationally complex squaring algorithm (i.e., O(n) as opposed
to O(n2)). Additionally, the same algorithm used for prime field multiplication
(Algorithm 3) can be used for binary field multiplication. The result is a 1.30 to
2.11 factor improvement over prime ISA extensions comparing fields of equivalent
security.
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Figure 7.7 graphs the energy per operation (signature + verification) for prime
and binary fields of equivalent security. One interesting thing to note is the re-
duced computational complexity with binary fields compared to prime fields. At
the smallest key size, the binary field is smaller than the prime field, and the bi-
nary ISA configuration consumes 52.2% less energy. At 256/283-bit, the field sizes
cross over such that the binary field is larger. However, in this case, binary is still
46.5% less energy. At the largest key size, the binary field is considerably larger
than its prime counterpart, and consequently, this configuration yields the lowest
improvement (22.8% less energy).
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Figure 7.7: Energy per Sign + Verify vs. key size, comparing prime and binary fields
of equivalent security.
Figure 7.7 also compares our ECDSA energy estimates of Billie with the other
systems. For full GF (2m) acceleration with Billie, we observe a 1.92 factor improve-
ment over Monte for 163-bit. However, as we move out to larger field sizes, the energy
94
cost for Billie converges with that of Monte. Thus, our binary-field accelerator is not
scaling well past 163-bit.
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Figure 7.8: Energy per Sign + Verify vs. key size for Monte (left) and Billie (right)
For a side-by-side comparison, Figure 7.8 shows the energy consumption broken
into subcomponents for both Monte (left) and Billie (right). It is interesting to
note that when Monte is used, Pete is still consuming most of the energy, in spite
of being idle for the majority of the computation. There are two reasons for this:
First, we are not using clock or power gating techniques because Pete is still fetching
instructions for Monte, so Pete’s clock network is still active. Second, Monte has less
logic overhead than Pete, and the size is fixed, regardless of the field being used. Billie
on the other hand, is the primary consumer of energy when used. Unfortunately,
we were unable to effectively model Billie’s register file with Cacti due to its non-
standard access width. Thus, we had to synthesize the register file with flip-flops,
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which makes for an inefficient implementation. Furthermore, Billie is designed to
scale in hardware with the field size and is consequently much larger than Pete. For
example, the 163-bit implementation requires 45% more area than Pete, while the
571-bit implementation requires five times the area of Pete. However, when ECDSA
is accelerated with Billie, on average only 38% of the execution time is spent on
scalar point multiplication. The rest of the time, Billie is idle, wasting energy, while
Pete performs the additional protocol arithmetic modulo the group order. In future
work, we would like to investigate the use of clock and power gating techniques to
eliminate this inefficiency.
Figure 7.9 depicts the energy consumption broken into subcomponents of all of the
hardware accelerated architectures for both 192/163- and 256/283-bit field sizes. As
illustrated, Billie reduces the RAM energy even further by keeping the entire scalar
point multiplication within her register file. The majority of the RAM accesses when
Billie is used are from Pete while performing arithmetic modulo the group order.
7.4 Power Consumption
Figure 7.10 provides a plot of the overall system power, broken down into static
and dynamic components, for each of the evaluated microarchitectures. Here we
averaged the baseline runs across all binary and prime fields because we saw little
variation in power due to different software configurations. We did the same for the
ISA extended architectures. In fact, we see almost no difference in overall system
power consumption between baseline and the ISA extended architecture (< 1%).
The hardware configuration with the Instruction Cache (IC) on average consumes
14.5% less power than the configuration without the cache. Despite the extra hard-
ware cost of the cache and the subsequent static power increase, the reduction in
ROM instruction reads leads to a significant power reduction overall. The configu-
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Figure 7.9: Breakdown of energy per Sign + Verify for 192/163- and 256/283-bit key
sizes into various sub-components.
ration with Monte reduces the power draw even further (18.6% less power compared
to baseline) by reducing the activity on Pete and the ROM. The systems with Bil-
lie, however, consume the most power overall. As previously mentioned, Billie is
significantly larger than Pete, and the amount of resources Billie consumes grows
approximately linear with field size. Also, we synthesized Billie’s large register file,
using flip-flops instead of RAM, which contributes to the approximately linear in-
crease power.
Although the static power in Figure 7.10 appears to be a minor portion of the
overall power (8.5%), much of the dynamic power includes the clock network. Thus,
our system could still benefit substantially from power and clock gating techniques.
This is especially true for the Billie accelerated systems in which Billie is idle but
still consuming power for 62% of the ECDSA operation.
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Figure 7.10: Static and dynamic power of evaluated microarchitectures.
7.5 Evaluation with Instruction Cache
Due to instruction fetch’s significant contribution to the overall energy per op-
eration, we felt further investigation was warranted. Our initial evaluation was to
model our three systems with an ideal 4KB direct-mapped instruction cache with a
16-byte line size.1 Although this cache model is unrealistic, it reveals the best case
energy benefit for each system. Figure 7.11 shows the energy improvement of each
system with an instruction cache across three key sizes.
Observe that the energy benefit of the instruction cache is much higher for the
microarchitectures without Monte. This is because instruction fetch contributes
much less to the overall energy consumption when using an accelerator. In such a
case, the processor is mostly idle, while the accelerator performs the majority of the
computation. Although Monte fetches internal microinstructions to carry out the
1In this model, we used Cacti to estimate the energy of the entire cache.
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multi-precision computation, the microcode table is only 64 entries and thus has an
insignificant effect on energy. Further proof of this assertion is illustrated by the
fact that the already small energy benefit decreases as the key size increases, i.e.,
as more of the computation is shifted to the accelerator. A final observation is that
the benefit of the instruction cache does not appear to be dependent on the key size
for the microarchitectures without Monte; however, this is simply a result of not
modeling cache misses.
��
����
��
����
��
�������
�������
�������
��
���
����
���
���
���
������������������ ����
Figure 7.11: Energy improvement with ideal instruction cache vs. key size.
The next step was to design an instruction cache in Verilog and run a full-system
energy estimation, using Cacti only to estimate the energy of the memories. In this
case, we fixed our workload to a P192 Sign/Verify operation and varied the instruc-
tion cache size from 1KB to 8KB. Additionally, we simulated our cache with and
without a prefetcher. Figure 7.12 shows our results broken down into subcompo-
nents. One surprising result is that there is not a lot of variation between the cache
configurations. Due to a higher number of cache misses, the configurations with the
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Figure 7.12: Energy per 192-bit Sign + Verify with real instruction cache for various
cache configurations. The “-p” indicates the presence of a prefetcher.
smaller caches lose the most amount of energy to the program ROM. However, the
energy consumption of the instruction cache goes up as the cache size is increased,
counteracting the benefit of reduced ROM reads.
For Pete, the general trend is that the energy consumption goes down as cache
size is increased or prefetching is utilized. This is due to the fact that the power of the
processor core does not vary significantly across different cache configurations. Thus,
the configuration with the smallest run time will yield the highest core efficiency.
Although Pete’s power does not vary significantly, it is interesting to note that the
power always goes up as the run time decreased. For instance, from a 1KB cache
to a 4KB cache, Pete’s power increases by 3.23%. This is cause by higher average
activity factors in the logic as Pete spends less time waiting for a miss to be serviced.
The energy consumption of the RAM remains relatively constant throughout the
different configurations, only varying by 11.1%. Because the RAM is fairly small
(16KB), the static power has less of an effect on the overall energy consumption.
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Even for the 1KB, non-prefetcher configuration, the static power contribution to the
RAM energy is only 41.7%. The rest of the RAM energy is based on the number
of reads and writes, which is not affected by the instruction cache configuration.
Although like the processor logic, the general trend of the RAM energy is to decrease
as the run time decreases.
The energy improvement due to prefecting decreases as the cache size increases,
and past 4KB, the prefetcher actually has a negative impact. This phenomenon can
be explained by the decreasing number of cache misses as the cache size is increased.
In the case of a 1KB cache, the prefetcher improves performance by 11.5%, but
with an 8KB cache, it only improves the performance by a mere 2.0%. With larger
caches, there is less opportunity for prefetching to improve performance. As seen
in Figure 7.12, the negative impact of prefetching comes from the increased number
of reads from program ROM as well as the increased power consumption in the
instruction cache. It might be possible to further improve the prefetching algorithm
for use with smaller cache configurations. Also, the benefits of prefetching would
be much greater in a system with high-latency access to main memory [39]. In our
system, however, the miss penalty is only three clock cycles.
It is interesting to note the drop in energy consumption from 2KB to 4KB is much
greater than from 1KB to 2KB. This is primarily due to the fact that the number
of cache misses drops more significantly from 2KB to 4KB. For example, from 1KB
to 2KB, the number of cache misses decreases by only 33.7% as opposed to 65.2%
from 2KB to 4KB. Similarly, from 4KB to 8KB, the decrease is a mere 18.3%. This
tells us that our working set is somewhere around 4KB. Putting the aforementioned
conclusions together, we see that the 4KB instruction cache without a prefetcher has
the lowest energy consumption. Compared to our baseline microarchitecture, this
equates to a 35.8% improvement in energy.
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For further evaluation, we modeled the 4KB instruction cache configuration across
the five NIST prime fields with ISA extensions enabled (Figure 7.13). For prime-field
support, this hardware configuration represents our most energy efficient configura-
tion without the assistance of a separate coprocessor. As we would expect, all of the
components except the ROM access scales.
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Figure 7.13: Energy per Sign + Verify vs. key size for prime ISA extended microar-
chitecture with 4KB instruction cache.
7.6 Performance Evaluation
For reference, we have included Table 7.1, which shows the latency (clock cycles)
per cryptographic operation for various prime-field configurations. The combined
Signature and Verification latency closely models an SSL handshake on the client
side.
Table 7.2 provides the latencies per crytographic operation (clock cycles) for the
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Table 7.1: Latency per operation (100K clock cycles) for prime-field microarchitec-
tures
µarchitecture Key Size Sign Verify Signature + Verification
Baseline 192-bit 26.9 34.27 61.2
Baseline 224-bit 37.2 47.9 85.1
Baseline 256-bit 57.2 72.8 130.0
Baseline 384-bit 133.6 174.9 308.5
Baseline 521-bit 297.2 304.8 602.0
ISA Ext 192-bit 20.5 25.6 46.1
ISA Ext 224-bit 27.5 34.6 62.1
ISA Ext 256-bit 42.7 53.7 96.4
ISA Ext 384-bit 90.9 114.6 205.5
ISA Ext 521-bit 184.0 230.5 414.5
W/ Monte 192-bit 6.0 7.5 13.4
W/ Monte 224-bit 8.3 10.3 18.6
W/ Monte 256-bit 10.9 13.4 24.2
W/ Monte 384-bit 28.2 34.9 63.0
W/ Monte 521-bit 64.5 78.2 142.7
binary-field systems.
To demonstrate the computational efficiency of Billie, Figure 7.14 shows the exe-
cution time of a scalar point multiplication versus the digit size of the multiplier. In
all other results but Figure 7.14 we use a 3-bit digit size for the GF (2m) multiplica-
tion unit. The 3-bit digit size was chosen because it was shown to be energy-optimal
in prior work [41]. For comparison, we graph prior work by Guo et al. that attempts
to eliminate control bottlenecks by integrating an 8-bit microprocessor into their
GF (2m) accelerator [42]. We plot points of prior work that were specifically noted
to be energy optimal and for which we have an equivalent implementation. Note
that we graph results for the sliding-window algorithm as well as the Montgomery
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Table 7.2: Latency per operation (100K clock cycles) for binary-field microarchitec-
tures
µarchitecture Key Size Sign Verify Signature + Verification
Baseline 163-bit 58.8 80.3 139.1
Baseline 233-bit 122.3 166.3 288.6
Baseline 283-bit 182.0 248.7 430.7
Baseline 409-bit 414.4 611.0 1025.5
Baseline 571-bit 1034.9 1420.2 2455.0
ISA Ext 163-bit 9.7 12.5 22.1
ISA Ext 233-bit 18.3 23.5 41.7
ISA Ext 283-bit 24.4 27.4 51.8
ISA Ext 409-bit 55.0 76.6 131.7
ISA Ext 571-bit 136.2 180.0 316.2
W/ Billie 163-bit 1.9 2.3 4.2
W/ Billie 233-bit 3.4 4.0 7.4
W/ Billie 283-bit 4.6 5.4 10.0
W/ Billie 409-bit 9.0 10.6 19.6
W/ Billie 571-bit 16.7 19.7 36.4
scalar point multiplication. In all cases, our Montgomery algorithm implementa-
tion outperforms prior work due to the efficient coprocessor interface we employ.
Additionally, our sliding-window algorithm implementation outperforms both Mont-
gomery implementations by a significant margin. We felt the comparison to prior
work was fair because the functional units in our work are similarly designed [41].
The increased performance of the sliding-window algorithm is responsible for some
of the energy efficiency gain in our work. Increased performance leads directly to a
shorter run time and a shorter run time leads to a lower amount of energy lost due
to static power. The register file in Billie also allows flexibility in algorithm design.
Individually, both the sliding-window algorithm used for single-point multiplication
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(signature) and the twin-point multiplication (verification) fit in the storage space
of Billie, precomputed points included.
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Figure 7.14: Performance for 163-bit scalar point multiply comparing Billie to prior
work [42].
7.7 Double Buffer Evaluation
To quantify the energy savings of Monte’s instruction reordering scheme, we
estimated energy consumption for 384-bit ECDSA with double buffering removed.
The results demonstrate that overlapping data movement with computation amounts
to a 13.5% improvement in energy consumption. The energy savings come from less
idle time for Pete and Monte in addition to a reduction in the number of reads to
shared memory. For the 192-bit key size, we measured a 9.4% reduction in energy
due to double buffering. Therefore, Monte with double buffering scales better with
larger key sizes. This is explained by the increasing time that data movement costs
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as the key size grows.
7.8 Baseline Validation
To validate the energy efficiency of our baseline microarchitecture, we measured
Pete against a similarly configured Microblaze processor (i.e. 5-stage pipeline, no
cache, no MMU, full 32-bit by 32-bit multiplier, binary divider) on the Xilinx Virtex-5
platform [47]. The synthesis results reveal that Pete requires 34.3% more LUT-flip-
flop pairs (i.e. more FPGA fabric); however, Pete requires 75.0% fewer Digital Signal
Processing (DSP) blocks compared to Microblaze. We attribute the difference in re-
source consumption to our Karatsuba multiplier. Muti-cycle multiplication performs
more addition and requires control logic, all of which utilize LUTs, while parallel mul-
tiplication maps well to the DSP hardware blocks on the Virtex-5. This trade-off is
a win in the ASIC realm, which is the target technology for this study. In terms of
performance, Pete outperforms Microblaze by 17.7% for a 384-bit ECDSA signature
and verification operation. Note that this is in spite of a longer latency multiplication
unit, which demonstrates an advantage of a separated multiplication unit over ISAs
without it.
To validate the efficiency of our multiplier, we synthesized Pete for a 45 nm tech-
nology library with various multiplier configurations and measured the power of Pete
with each configuration using the methods further explained in the Methodologies
section. Compared to Pete with a traditional operand-scanning, multi-cycle multi-
plier with the same latency, our measurements showed a 4.69% decrease in dynamic
power and a 3.47% increase in static power. Because dynamic power dominates,
Karatsuba’s technique yielded an average power savings of 3.52%. Compared to
Pete with a parallel pipelined multiplier as found in many of the modern 32-bit
RISC cores, our Karatusba, multi-cycle multiplier demonstrated a 10.6% and 28.4%
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improvement in dynamic and static power, respectively. This equates to a 13.4%
power savings overall. Further investigation is necessary to determine how much
energy savings this yields.
7.9 FFAU Evaluation
This section of the paper provides the results of our FFAU study prior to the
development of the full ECC hardware/software system. The purpose of this study
was to characterize the core computation logic for our accelerator and to determine
the most optimal datapath width in terms of energy and power. To demonstrate the
energy efficiency of the FFAU design, we measured the average power and execution
time of Montgomery multiplication for key sizes of 192-bit, 256-bit, and 384-bit.
These results assume a 100 MHz clock and 0.9V supply voltage for logic and 0.7V for
memory. Table 7.3 provides a breakdown of the average static and dynamic power
consumed by the 8-bit, 16-bit, 32-bit, and 64-bit variants of our design for each
of the Montgomery multiplications. In all cases, dynamic power is the dominant
component. This is primarily due to the small memories, low supply voltage, and
high utilization of the arithmetic logic. The leakage power provides us some insight
into how much power will be consumed if power gating is not utilized while the FFAU
is idle.
Table 7.4 provides the total average power along with execution time and energy
per Montgomery multiplication with respect to the datapath width. When com-
paring integer key sizes from smallest to largest, we note that average power only
increases slightly, whereas the computation time increases quadratically. The in-
crease in average power is mainly due to a linear increase in memory, which accounts
for an increase in leakage power. The significant increase in computation time is
due to the O(n2) nature of the multiplication operation. When comparing datapath
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Table 7.3: Area utilization, static power, and dynamic power vs. datapath width.
Datapath Width Area(cell units) Static Power Dynamic Power
Key Size: 192-bit
8-bit 2,091 32.3 µW 166.2 µW
16-bit 4,244 59.3 µW 311.9 µW
32-bit 11,329 159.1 µW 659.9 µW
64-bit 36,582 530.6 µW 1,472.7 µW
Key Size: 256-bit
8-bit 2,091 34.0 µW 186.2 µW
16-bit 4,244 61.6 µW 310.2 µW
32-bit 11,327 161.4 µW 684.4 µW
64-bit 36,582 532.9 µW 1,613.4 µW
Key Size: 384-bit
8-bit 2,168 35.4 µW 197.1 µW
16-bit 4,322 65.0 µW 321.6 µW
32-bit 11,405 164.3 µW 888.5 µW
64-bit 36,664 535.7 µW 1,686.5 µW
bit widths of the FFAU, the average power increases less than quadratically as the
datapath width doubles. The net result is that the energy per CIOS operation tends
to decrease as the datapath width increases.
To demonstrate this, Figure 7.15 charts the amount of energy consumed per 192-
bit, 256-bit, and 384-bit operation for each of the variants of the FFAU. Due to
the fact that the CIOS algorithm is not perfectly quadratic, the decrease in energy
consumed per operation does not continue. As can be seen for the 192-bit key case
with a 32-bit datapath, at some point increasing the datapath width starts to increase
the energy consumed, leading to an optimal datapath width in terms of energy for
a given key size. We believe this trend continues for larger key sizes; however, the
optimal datapath width is greater than or equal to 64-bits.
The results show that an algorithm with a O(n2) time complexity favors a larger
datapath when considering energy efficiency, while the energy efficiency of a O(n)
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Figure 7.15: Energy per Montgomery multiplication vs. datapath width
algorithm will not be significantly affected by datapath size. Moreover, for an algo-
rithm exhibiting a O(1) behavior, a decrease in datapath size will yield an increase
in energy efficiency.
In order to provide some insight into the relative energy efficiency of the FFAU,
Figure 7.15 also includes the energy per operation estimations for the ARM Cortex-
M3 operating at 100 MHz with a 0.9V supply voltage. Table 7.5 lists the energy
estimations for the ARM processor since they extend beyond the scale of the graph in
Figure 7.15. In terms of performance, the FFAU on average yields a 10x improvement
over the ARM.
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Table 7.4: Average power, execution time, and energy per Montgomery multiplica-
tion vs. datapath width
Width Average Power Ex. Time Energy
Key Size: 192-bit
8-bit 198.5 µW 13,920 ns 2.763 nJ
16-bit 371.2 µW 4,220 ns 1.566 nJ
32-bit 819.0 µW 1,520 ns 1.245 nJ
64-bit 2,004.3 µW 710 ns 1.423 nJ
Key Size: 256-bit
8-bit 220.2 µW 23,510 ns 5.176 nJ
16-bit 371.8 µW 6,710 ns 2.495 nJ
32-bit 845.7 µW 2,150 ns 1.818 nJ
64-bit 2,146.3 µW 830 ns 1.782 nJ
Key Size: 384-bit
8-bit 232.5 µW 50,550 ns 11.755 nJ
16-bit 386.6 µW 13,830 ns 5.347 nJ
32-bit 888.5 µW 4,110 ns 3.652 nJ
64-bit 2,222.3 µW 1,410 ns 3.133 nJ
Table 7.5: Average power and energy per modular multiplication vs. key size for the
ARM Cortex-M3
Key Size Ex. Time Average Power Energy
192-bit 13,870 ns 4,500 µW 62.4 nJ
256-bit 23,010 ns 4,500 µW 103.6 nJ
384-bit 48,530 ns 4,500 µW 218.4 nJ
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8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In conclusion, we have provided a thorough analysis of the design space for ultra-
low energy asymmetric cryptography across a broad range of security levels, includ-
ing up to 571-bit key sizes. We began by evaluating the energy per asymmetric
cryptographic operation (ECDSA signature + verification) on an efficient baseline
architecture centered around a pipelined RISC processor. We then included simple,
yet beneficial prime-field instruction set extensions to our microarchitecture and eval-
uated the improvement in terms of energy per operation compared to baseline. Next,
we introduced a reconfigurable, prime-field accelerator to our microarchitecture and
measured the energy per operation against the baseline and the ISA extended archi-
tectures. To reduce the energy impact of instruction fetch from program ROM, we
integrated an instruction cache into our ISA extended architecture and evaluated the
energy benefit. For a comparison of prime and binary fields, we extended our mi-
croarchitecture to include support for binary fields. To do so, we added two carry-less
arithmetic instructions to our extended ISA and compared the results to the prime-
field implementations. Finally, we augmented our system with a non-configurable,
binary-field accelerator and evaluated the energy consumption.
Our analysis showed that the energy benefit of hardware acceleration increases
substantially as the required level of security increases. We also demonstrated that,
depending on the energy cost of instruction reads, the accelerated microarchitecture
can reduce power as well as execution time, which exaggerates the advantages of
hardware acceleration when considering an energy-delay product. We will now take
a moment to discuss on-going research and future work.
Our evaluation has revealed some interesting avenues for future work. First,
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we discovered that over half of Billie’s energy is being consumed in the synthesized
register file. Thus, we would like to evaluate the energy consumption of Billie with
a register file implemented in more efficient memory (SRAM) technology, rather
than flip-flops. To do so, we plan on modeling the register file with HSPICE, using
a 45nm transistor model [48]. Second, we found that when accelerating GF (2m),
the protocol arithmetic modulo the group order (inversion specifically) becomes the
limiting factor, because it does not map to the accelerator. In computer design
terminology, Amdahl’s law strikes again [21]. Therefore, we plan on investigating
various methods for accelerating the modular inversion. Finally, we found that our
binary-field accelerator does not scale well in terms of energy efficiency. This is
primarily due to the increase in power consumption as the field size increases. As
a result, we plan on modeling our system such that we can turn off Billie when she
is not in use. Furthermore, we would like to experiment with divide and conquer
algorithms in software that would facilitate larger field size computation on a smaller
variant of Billie.
Our existing methodologies make use of Cacti to estimate the energy consumed in
our memories, including our ROM. A significant portion of our overall energy is being
consumed in the ROM, and Cacti was never intended to model ROM. We understand
that our use of Cacti for ROM energy estimation introduces inaccuracies in our
evaluation. Although we do not feel the inaccuracies would be impactful enough
to change the conclusions drawn from this study, more detail modeling of ROM
memory would increase our overall confidence in our work and hopefully provide
future insight into energy efficient embedded systems. As discussed in Chapter 6,
the energy consumption of our logic was evaluated at a 45nm technology node. We
would like to perform circuit level modeling of our ROM with Synopsys HSPICE [48].
To do so, we will use the Predictive Technology Model (PTM) provide by Arizona
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State University (ASU) for our 45 nm model card [49].
Currently, our system assumes that non-volatile memory is made up of ROM in
the purist sense. In other words, the ROM is not reprogrammable after fabrication.
For some target devices, such as IMDs, this is an unrealistic assumption. Thus, we
would like to model our system assuming a flash Electronic Erasable Programmable
ROM (EEPROM) memory technology in place of the ROM. This component of
analysis requires an accurate simulation model card of flash technology for a 45nm
technology node. This model card provides the HSPICE simulator with the electrical
characteristics of the flash cells and is essential for accurate modeling of flash memory.
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